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Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood Conservation Districts
and the Regulation of Aesthetics
ANIKA SINGH LEMAR*
Over the last thirty years, municipalities across the country have embraced
neighborhood conservation districts, regulations that impose design standards at the
neighborhood level. Despite their adoption in thirty-five states, in municipalities
from Boise to Cambridge, neighborhood conservation districts have evaded critical
analysis by legal scholars. By regulating features such as architectural style, roof
angle, and maximum eave overhang, conservation districts purport to protect
“neighborhood character” or “cultural stability.” Implicit in these regulations is
the unsupported assumption that the essential feature of a neighborhood’s character
is its architectural design at a single point in time. The unfortunate result is zoning
as taxidermy, rather than land-use planning that permits places to evolve to meet
changing needs and preferences. Conservation districts freeze places in time,
exclude would-be residents from desirable neighborhoods, and threaten to increase
the cost of housing in those neighborhoods and the cities in which they are located.
Urban culture is defined by dynamism, vitality, and an ability to adapt to and
accommodate population and market shifts. Conservation district regulations should
be crafted in that same spirit, to preserve cities and suburbs as places amenable to
change. They should not only permit but also promote investment and
redevelopment, particularly redevelopment of neighborhoods that, because they are
close to public amenities, are well suited to dense development. This Article urges
state legislators to cabin local authority to enact conservation districts. Revisions to
state zoning-enabling legislation can ensure that these regulations (i) are not
exclusionary, (ii) are responsive to changing market dynamics and evolving
consumer preferences, and (iii) do not artificially inflate housing prices.
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INTRODUCTION
Emboldened in recent decades by modern-era case law that permits land-use
regulations to be grounded only in aesthetics, local governments have embraced
zoning codes that regulate the design of a structure, not simply its use or its size.
Originally, zoning ordinances served primarily to segregate uses.1 In addition, in
order to preserve light and air, zoning ordinances have long regulated the bulk of a
building by limiting height, establishing setback lines, setting minimum and
maximum square footages, and imposing maximum floor-area ratios.2 Design review
ordinances go beyond ordinary use and bulk regulations to consider a building’s
aesthetics.3 These ordinances establish design standards and oftentimes entrust an
appointed board or commission with the review of the proposed design of a building,
including choice of building materials, roof lines, siting and orientation, and scale.
For example, a neighborhood conservation district4 in Phoenix, Arizona, requires all
commercial buildings to be built with traditional agrarian materials, such as adobe.5
Another such district in the Avon Hill neighborhood of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
expressly prohibits the use of vinyl siding and requires a local commission to
consider the “site layout” of accessory buildings when determining whether to permit

1. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); 1 ARDEN H.
RATHKOPF, DAREN A. RATHKOPF, SARA C. BRONIN & DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, RATHKOPF’S THE
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1:5 (4th ed. 2014).
2. 3 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 1, § 54:2.
3. Throughout this Article, the term “aesthetics” is used just as J. J. Dukeminier used the
term in his 1955 article on aesthetic zoning to mean “[o]f or pertaining to the appreciation or
criticism of the beautiful” limited to “phenomena evident to sight only, not discernible by the
other senses.” J. J. Dukeminier, Jr., Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 218 n.2 (1955).
4. The ordinances described and analyzed in this Article go by many names, including
village districts, design overlay districts, neighborhood conservation districts, and
neighborhood preservation districts. They all establish design standards based on the context
existing in the district on the day of the regulation’s adoption and are adopted, implemented,
or administered sublocally. See infra Part II.A. Given that the shared mission of these various
districts is to “conserve” the existing architectural and cultural fabric of already-developed
neighborhoods, this Article will use the terms “conservation district” or “neighborhood
conservation district.”
5. PHX., ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 6, § 649(J)(5) (Supp. 2015) (outlining which
building materials should be incorporated into commercial buildings within a Mixed Use
Agricultural District).
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their construction.6 A design review ordinance in Noank, Connecticut, requires the
local zoning commission to consider “the rhythm of solids to voids in the façade”
and the “[r]hythm of spacing of buildings on the street” when determining whether
to allow issuance of a building permit.7 And a district in Dallas requires all new
construction to be limited to single-family High Tudors, of the type that were
commonly built in that neighborhood in the 1920s.8 While conservation districts
share some characteristics with historic districts, they are distinguishable both
procedurally and substantively and merit analysis separate from historic districts.9
This Article accomplishes two tasks, both crucial to a critical analysis of
neighborhood conservation districts and, more generally, the role of aesthetics in
land-use regulations.10 First, it argues that the increase in the use of aesthetics in
zoning regulations is attributable in significant part to an increased consumer
preference for housing located in urban residential neighborhoods that are close to
downtown districts, jobs, transportation infrastructure, or other immobile amenities,
such as waterfronts. Homeowners respond to the perceived threat that increased
demand will adversely change their neighborhoods by freezing development
patterns, thus limiting supply. As a result, these regulations, like restrictive zoning
regulations generally, threaten to increase housing prices, thus contributing to a
dearth of housing affordable to middle-income families in urban areas.11 Second, this
Article argues that conservation districts should be understood and treated as a form
of exclusionary, overly restrictive zoning of the sort that has been criticized by
commentators and land-use scholars.12 In order to advance housing affordability

6. Cambridge, Mass., Avon Hill Neighborhood Conservation Dist. Designation Order
§ V(C)(4)–(5) (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/AHNCD
_order.pdf (amended order).
7. GROTON, CONN., ZONING ORDINANCE FOR THE NOANK FIRE DISTRICT § 2.26.3.5, at 11
(2012) (on file with author).
8. Dall., Tex., Ordinance 25,116 (Nov. 12, 2002).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 47–59.
10. To date, scholarship on neighborhood conservation districts is quite limited. More
than three hundred articles archived on Westlaw discuss business improvement districts,
another form of sublocal governance structure, while just twenty-two articles mention
neighborhood conservation districts. There are a few noteworthy exceptions, each of which
tackles discrete elements of the conservation-district concept and none of which challenges
the role played by cultural stability and neighborhood context in land-use regulations. See
William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The New Belt and Suspenders of
Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339 (2013) (addressing the use of conservation districts
to replicate covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) in already-developed
neighborhoods); Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697
(2010) (arguing that while design overlays play an important role in permitting communities
to establish community aesthetics, these overlays should be reformulated to permit revision
over time and to put new homeowners on notice of existing restrictions); Adam Lovelady,
Comment, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and the Role of Neighborhood
Conservation Districts, 40 URB. LAW. 147 (2008) (advocating for neighborhood conservation
districts as preservation tools and useful alternatives to historic districts).
11. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1674 n.7 (2013)
(collecting sources).
12. See infra notes 224, 226 and accompanying text.

1528

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1525

and account for the interests of all housing consumers, aesthetic regulations must
accommodate changing market dynamics and evolving consumer preferences. In
particular, state legislators should require that local aesthetic regulations permit
neighborhoods to evolve and change over time in response to shifts in market demand.
Part I of this Article describes the current state of case law and scholarship on the
role of aesthetics in land-use regulations, and it highlights the role that cultural
stability has played in defining the contours of aesthetic land-use regulations. Part II,
based on a review of regulations from various jurisdictions, argues that residential
neighborhoods embrace conservation districts in an effort to resist development
pressures resulting from the desirability of urban areas and “streetcar suburbs.” Part
III concludes that requiring aesthetic regulations, like conservation districts, to be
grounded in existing context comes at the expense of competing interests, including
affordability, community empowerment, and inclusivity. Part IV proposes that
conservation districts be reimagined to permit change and dynamism. Rather than
seeking to invalidate all aesthetic regulations, this Article argues that state
zoning-enabling legislation should prevent the use of aesthetic regulations to advance
exclusionary policies.
I. REVISITING THE CASE FOR AESTHETICS: COMMUNITY VALUES AND CONTEXT
Neighbors often desire the ability to dictate the aesthetics of a neighbor’s
property. Undoubtedly, when a person purchases property, he or she is setting a price
based not only on the property in question but also on the state of the surrounding
properties and the qualities of the neighborhood. As the aphorism goes, “location,
location, location.” A home in a well-maintained neighborhood has a very different
value when placed in a blighted community. Because “neighborhood” is an element
of the purchase price paid by a homebuyer, many homebuyers, once they become
homeowners, desire to control certain actions taken by their neighbors with respect
to their properties. As a result, a property owner and his or her neighbors may have
competing interests in the use of a single parcel of land and, provided that the
property owner’s intended use does not rise to the level of a nuisance or violate local
law, the nature of their interests does not establish a process by which neighbors can
have input in land-use decisions.13 Aesthetic regulations provide a possible
public-law mechanism to expand neighbor control of land use.
In the decades following Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,14 courts routinely
rejected local attempts to impose aesthetic land-use regulations.15 Treating aesthetics
as a purely subjective inquiry incapable of supporting coherent land-use regulations,

13. These competing interests in property usage and maintenance drive the contemporary
use of CC&Rs in residential developments. See infra notes 163–70 and accompanying text.
14. 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (holding that zoning is a proper exercise of the police power).
Euclidean zoning, so named for Euclid, Ohio, the defendant in that 1926 Supreme Court case,
divides a municipality into various sections and designates which uses are permissible in which
sections. A simple Euclidean zoning ordinance separates residential, commercial, and industrial
uses. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS, JR. & CHRISTOPHER SERKIN,
LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 95–100 (4th ed. 2013).
15. Samuel Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions
Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125, 126 (1980).
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early twentieth century courts consistently held that aesthetics alone could not serve
as a basis for exercise of the police power.16 Over time, however, particularly in a
line of cases addressing regulation of billboards and junkyards,17 courts couched
validation of aesthetic regulations in health, safety, or the general welfare. Courts
remained hesitant to hold explicitly that aesthetics alone could support the
application of land-use regulations as a function of the police power.18 Instead, courts
upheld aesthetic ordinances by finding that they served other valid purposes, such as
furthering the “general welfare,” increasing property values, or supporting local
tourism.19 But “the asserted linkages between aesthetics and these goals were often
dubious, if not transparently fictional.”20
As early as 1955, some argued that this subterfuge was unnecessary and that
courts ought to acknowledge that aesthetics, even standing on its own, was a
reasonable and constitutional basis for the exercise of zoning authority.21 Indeed,
through 1980, land-use case law steadily trended toward permitting zoning
regulations and other land-use restrictions to be based solely on aesthetics. 22 Since
then, the trend has continued, but at a slower pace.23 The result is that, by one count,

16. Meg Stevenson, Aesthetic Regulations: A History, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 519, 520 (2006).
17. Id. at 530–34. This Article saves for another day the question whether the construction
of an edifice of aesthetic case law on a foundation of junkyard and billboard cases has created
bad policy. Allowing land-use authorities to single out junkyards and billboards is surely
distinguishable from allowing the same authorities to limit the number of dormers on a home
or to require developers and homeowners to use a gabled rather than a hip roof. In the case of
aesthetic regulations, it is possible that easy cases have made for bad law.
18. 2 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 1, § 16:4 (citing cases).
19. Id. § 16:2.
20. John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the
Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 374 (1982); see also Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 223.
21. Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 223. In a footnote, Dukeminier noted that a then-recent
U.S. Supreme Court case might provide the guidance and direction necessary for state courts
to conclude, finally, that aesthetics is an entirely proper consideration when crafting and
enforcing zoning ordinances. Id. at 237 n.70. The case to which Dukeminier referred dealt not
with zoning but, instead, with eminent domain. In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in
Berman v. Parker, that the condemnation of a blighted property was a proper exercise of the
police power. In other words, a municipality could take a privately held property simply
because that property did not meet aesthetic standards without finding itself in contravention
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). As Dukeminier
predicted, twenty years later, the Supreme Court, in dicta, found expressly that aesthetics is a
proper consideration in zoning. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (“The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample
to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”).
22. Bufford, supra note 15, at 127–28; see also Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or
Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Development,
78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 483 (1998). One influential scholar, John Costonis, argued that the
wholesale shift in judicial thinking on aesthetics was inevitable. “This silliness had to end.
Americans wanted and were entitled to aesthetics regulation even if they seemed unable to
state and, perhaps, to understand why.” JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW,
AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 23 (1989).
23. See Kenneth Pearlman, Elizabeth Linville, Andrea Phillips & Erin Prosser, Beyond
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in approximately thirty-five states, in the District of Columbia, and at the federal
level, courts do not question legislative and administrative land-use determinations
purportedly grounded in aesthetics,24 particularly where there is purported to be
community support for aesthetic determinations.25 In five other states, courts have
allowed regulations based on aesthetics when aesthetics is but one of multiple
bases.26 These state courts have not, however, opined on whether aesthetics alone is
sufficient.27 In ten states, courts have held that aesthetics alone is insufficient.28
Rather than question this trend in land-use law, scholars have sought to validate
it. As aesthetic regulations became more commonly accepted over the course of the
twentieth century, scholars struggled to identify an underlying principle that would
both support and meaningfully limit the use of aesthetics in land-use regulations.29
In the course of those validation efforts, scholars embraced cultural stability and the
preservation of buildings and places that are “icon[s] in the community mind”30 as
accepted bases for the use of aesthetics in land-use regulations.31 Behind these

the Eye of the Beholder Once Again: A New Review of Aesthetic Regulation, 38 URB. LAW.
1119, 1120 (2006).
24. Id. at 1147–49, 1181.
25. “Modern doctrine . . . requir[es] that regulation reflect a widespread pattern of
community preference and not simply the aesthetic tastes of a narrow elite . . . .” 2 RATHKOPF
ET AL., supra note 1, § 16:7, at 16-31; see also United Adver. Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen,
198 A.2d 447, 449 (N.J. 1964) (“We refer not to some sensitive or exquisite preference but to
concepts of congruity held so widely that they are inseparable from the enjoyment and hence
the value of property.”); State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451, 455 (Wis. 1923) (“The
rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an ultra-æsthetic taste. But
whether they should be permitted to plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well
may be pondered.”).
26. See Pearlman et al., supra note 23, at 1163–67.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1167–80.
29. See Costonis, supra note 20, at 359–60; Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 237; Poindexter,
supra note 22, at 488; Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Aesthetics in Ohio Land Use Law: Preserving
Beauty in the Parlor and Keeping Pigs in the Barnyard, 19 AKRON L. REV. 1, 33 (1985).
30. COSTONIS, supra note 22, at 84. Costonis defines “icons” as “features invested with
values that confirm our sense of order and identity.” Id. at xv. Conversely, “‘aliens’ threaten the
icons and hence our investment in the icons’ values.” Id. at xv–xvi. Costonis defines “cultural
stability” as a resistance to “rapid or fundamental changes” that threaten fundamental institutions
including “[f]amily, religion, education, language, and government.” Costonis, supra note 20, at
418. The environment, playing a “socially integrative and, hence, identity-nurturing role,” is
another such fundamental institution. Id. Hence, for our purposes, policies advancing cultural
stability seek to curtail rapid or fundamental changes to the built environment.
31. See 2 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 1, § 16:7 n.9 (citing Costonis for his analysis and
finding it consistent with modern case law on aesthetic zoning); Dukeminier, supra note 3, at
231 (“Zoning restrictions which implement a policy of neighborhood amenity should be
voided, if at all, not because they are for aesthetic objectives but only because the restrictions
are unreasonable devices of implementing community policy.”); Poindexter, supra note 22, at
505–06 (finding that zoning based on aesthetics serves a public good because it encourages
community participation). In an article that appeared a few years after Law and Aesthetics and
a few years before Icons and Aliens, Edward H. Ziegler, Jr. made a plea similar to that made
by Costonis and Dukeminier. He argued that aesthetics ought to inform land-use and zoning
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attempts is an assumption that a person’s neighbors have a legitimate interest in
“preserving” the neighborhood in the state in which it existed on the day that they
purchased their homes.32 Cultural stability has proved an attractive grounding for
aesthetic rulemaking both because it encapsulates the prevailing sentiment that
neighborhood homeowners ought to be able to stop time and prevent change and
because, proponents argue, it can be defined objectively.33 Whether a building is
visually appealing is a subjective inquiry.34 Whether a building is consistent with the
existing architectural context is a supposedly objective one. As described in Part II,
neighborhood conservation districts—by defining acceptable visual features with
reference to the existing architectural context—embrace this approach to aesthetics.
As a result, they provide a point of departure for considering and evaluating the role
of aesthetics and context in land-use regulation.
II. CONSERVATION DISTRICTS: LAND-USE ORDINANCES
BASED SOLELY ON AESTHETICS
Neighborhood conservation districts (1) establish design standards based on the
context existing in the district on the day of the regulation’s adoption and (2) are
adopted, implemented, or administered sublocally.35 They represent a single type of

regulations only where:
(1) There is a reasonable basis to believe that those features of the visual
environment selected for protection reflect and embody widely shared human
meanings and associations that the regulation is intended to preserve; (2) There
exist reasonably intelligible standards for regulation derived from those existing
features of the visual environment selected for protection; and (3) That the
regulation as applied is reasonably related to preventing a “patently offensive”
harm to those features of the visual environment selected for protection.
Ziegler, supra note 29, at 33. The protection of buildings and landscapes that “reflect and
embody widely shared human meanings and associations” and the development of standards
based on existing features or context are examples of regulating cultural stability. See id.
32. Judges, citing property-value protection as a proper rationale for regulation, also
assume that property owners have a right to preservation. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors
v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa 1969) (holding that preservation of a neighborhood is
a valid concern for zoning, in part because such preservation can stabilize property values).
One observer, discussing neighborhood outrage sparked by a proposed redevelopment project,
described this outrage in terms of residents’ “psychological ownership” of the neighborhood.
Sadia Latifi, Growth Foments a Fuss in Chapel Hill, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
August 3, 2008, at 1A (quoting an observer of a battle between a developer and local residents
as commenting that the developer may have “underestimated the community’s psychological
ownership” of the area).
33. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 20, at 437, 440.
34. See Poindexter, supra note 22, at 486.
35. One of the two defining features is procedural in nature. As Carol Rose has argued,
procedure is crucial in designing aesthetic land-use regulations. Carol M. Rose, Preservation
and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473,
517–18 (1981). As discussed further below, Richard Briffault popularized the use of the term
“sublocal structures” to refer to neighborhood-level institutions that “provide for a variety of
territorially based differences in taxation, services, or regulation within individual cities.”
Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV.
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aesthetic land-use regulation but an increasingly popular one. One recent survey
identified 165 such districts in thirty-five states.36 In 1983, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
was one of the first municipalities to adopt neighborhood conservation districts.37
Cities as diverse as Nashville,38 Dallas,39 Miami,40 Boise,41 and Chapel Hill42
followed, and conservation districts continue to be proposed and adopted today.43
Despite that fact, to date, neighborhood conservation districts have evaded critical
investigation from legal scholars.44 The existing scholarship and commentary is
dominated by historic preservationists advocating for conservation-district

503, 508 (1997).
36. JESSIE MCCLURG, NEIGHBORHOOD P’SHIPS FOR CMTY. RESEARCH, ALTERNATIVE FORMS
OF HISTORIC DESIGNATION: A STUDY OF NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.cura.umn.edu/sites/cura.advantagelabs.com
/files/publications/NPCR-1331.pdf.
37. See CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL COMM’N, NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS IN
CAMBRIDGE (2002), available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov/Historic/ncd_brochure.pdf.
38. Lovelady, supra note 10, at 158–59 (“Then, in 1985, in an effort to protect
neighborhoods that did not support full historic zoning, city officials introduced the NCD.
Lockeland Springs-East End was the first . . . .”).
39. Dall., Tex., Ordinance 19,910 (Mar. 23, 1988) (establishing “Conservation District
No. 1,” the Kings Highway Conservation District).
40. MIAMI, FLA., MIAMI 21 CODE app. A (2012) (describing neighborhood conservation
districts and their regulations).
41. CITY OF BOISE PLANNING & DEV. SERVS., BOISE CITY HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN
2010, at 26 (2010), available at http://pds.cityofboise.org/media/210354/draft_preservation
_plan.pdf (“Conservation Districts are another tool that the City of Boise has implemented to
preserve certain neighborhood’s characteristics. . . . In 2010, there [were] two adopted
conservation districts in the City of Boise.”).
42. NORTHSIDE NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DIST. COMM., DESIGN GUIDELINES 1
(2004), available at http://www.townofchapelhill.org/home/showdocument?id=729 (“The
Town of Chapel Hill Land Use Management Ordinance adopted by the Town Council on
January 27, 2003 includes a provision for creating Neighborhood Conservation Districts.”).
The Town of Chapel Hill temporarily suspended the creation of new neighborhood
conservation districts in 2012. See TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL, A RESOLUTION TEMPORARILY
SUSPENDING PROCESSING OF PROPOSED NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS (2012),
available at http://chapelhillpublic.novusagenda.com/AttachmentViewer.aspx?AttachmentID
=9029&ItemID=1687.
43. See, e.g., CITY OF TOPEKA PLANNING DEP’T, NOTICE OF NEIGHBORHOOD INFORMATION
MEETING & PUBLIC HEARING 1 (2013), available at http://www.topeka.org/pdfs
/WestboroNCDNIM.pdf (notifying affected property owners of a proposal to create a
neighborhood conservation district); Andreae Downs, Brookline OK’s Tighter Zoning Bylaw,
New District Is Applied to Apartment Complex, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2011, at 2 (describing the
adoption of the first neighborhood conservation district in Brookline, Massachusetts); Felipe
Azenha, Upper Eastside Neighborhood Conservation District, MIAMI URBANIST (June 13,
2012), http://www.miamiurbanist.com/upper-eastside-neighborhood-conservation-district/
(giving notice of a meeting to discuss the City of Miami’s proposal for a new neighborhood
conservation district); Tere O’Connell, Saving the Good Stuff, PRESERVATION AUSTIN (April 1,
2013), http://www.preservationaustin.org/blog/saving-the-good-stuff (citing Raleigh’s and Dallas’s
experience with neighborhood conservation districts as possible models for Austin rezoning).
44. See supra note 10.
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adoption45 and planners undertaking descriptive accounts of conservation-district
ordinances.46
Neighborhood conservation districts are not historic districts. The adoption
standards for historic districts are higher than those for conservation districts.47 State
enabling legislation limits local historic-district designations to areas that have some
historical significance.48 Sometimes the local or state law requires buildings to be at
least fifty or more years old.49 In addition, the historical integrity of the neighborhood
must be intact.50 If recent development has compromised the historic fabric of the
area, the neighborhood may no longer be eligible for local historic-district
designation. Conservation districts are not subject to any of these substantive
requirements.51 In fact, because the adoption standards are lower,
conservation-district advocates argue that neighborhood conservation districts “can
be useful . . . when a neighborhood does not meet the minimum requirements for
historic designation.”52 For example, Iowa City designates both historic districts and
conservation districts. Conservation districts have “fewer properties that retain a high
degree of historic integrity or contribute to a distinct sense of time and place,” but
these districts “are still considered worthy of protection.”53

45. See, e.g., JULIA MILLER, PROTECTING OLDER NEIGHBORHOODS THROUGH
CONSERVATION DISTRICT PROGRAMS (2004).
46. See, e.g., MCCLURG, supra note 36.
47. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-400.3 (West 2000) (defining historic districts,
in part, as areas deemed to have special historical, prehistorical, architectural, or cultural
significance).
49. Such laws incorporate the definition of “historic” used by the National Park Service’s
National Register of Historic Places Program. That definition requires a property to be “old
enough to be considered historic (generally at least 50 years old).” National Register of
Historic Places Program: Fundamentals, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov
/nr/national_register_fundamentals.htm.
50. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-400.3 (defining historic districts as having
“integrity of design, setting, materials, feeling, and association”). This requirement in state
and local laws incorporates National Register of Historic Places criteria evaluating “whether
the area retains the spatial organization, physical components, and aspects of design and
historic associations that it acquired during its period of significance.” CITY OF AUSTIN
HISTORIC PRES. OFFICE, CITY OF AUSTIN LOCAL HISTORIC DISTRICT NOMINATION APPLICATION
& INSTRUCTIONS 4 (2012), available at http://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files
/Planning/Historic_Preservation/lhd_zoning_application.pdf.
51. MILLER, supra note 45, at 2 (advocating neighborhood conservation-district adoption
where “an area may not be old enough to qualify as historic; the houses in the area, although
representative of a particular era of development, may be distinctive but not sufficiently
noteworthy to merit full protection; or the area may have been compromised through
incompatible development”).
52. Lovelady, supra note 10, at 154; see also WILMINGTON, DEL., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 48-422(d) (2014) (“Neighborhood conservation districts may be designated where
traditional city historic district protection is not feasible due to . . . [a] built environment whose
resources do not meet the qualification criteria of either the National Register of Historic
Places or city historic districts.”); MILLER, supra note 45, at 1 (“[T]hese neighborhoods tend
not to merit designation as a historic district . . . .”).
53. IOWA CITY, IOWA, CITY CODE § 14-3B-2(C) (Supp. 2015); see also MCCLURG, supra
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In addition, in some states, the process for adopting a conservation district is less
onerous than that required for adopting a historic district. For example, in
Connecticut, adoption of a local historic district requires the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the property owners in the proposed district as well as passage of an
ordinance by the municipality’s legislative body.54 The process for adopting
conservation districts, termed “village districts,” requires only that the local zoning
commission adopt the district, just as it would adopt any other zoning regulation.55
In fact, neighborhood conservation districts are routinely described as historic
districts lite.56 They “have less stringent regulatory hurdles and more flexibility in
implementation [than do local historic districts], so they can be tailored to the
physical, historical, or political needs of particular neighborhoods.”57 Because
conservation districts, unlike historic districts, are not preserving well-defined
historic architectural characteristics, regulations can be imprecise and ill defined.58
At the same time, and worse still, conservation districts lack meaningful eligibility
standards.59 They can be used in neighborhoods that do not qualify for

note 36, at 16 (“After many years of establishing historic districts, cities began to create
conservation districts in order to protect the character of neighborhoods that may not have
been eligible for historic designation, but that had distinct characteristics worth preserving.”).
54. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-147b(i) (West Supp. 2014).
55. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2j(a) (West Supp. 2014). Most Connecticut municipalities
do not require the zoning ordinance to be approved by the local legislature. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-1 (West 2010).
56. See, e.g., LORI SALGANICOFF, PRES. ALLIANCE OF GREATER PHILA., NEIGHBORHOOD
CONSERVATION DISTRICTS SURVEY 2 (2003), available at http://www.preservationalliance.com
/publications/Conservation%20District%20Description.pdf (“Very generally, Conservation
District programs can be divided into two categories: ‘historic district-lite’ and zoning/land
use.”); Lisa Sorg, Demolition Derby; Preservation Texas Designates Five SA Neighborhoods
as Threatened, CURRENT (San Antonio, Tex.), March 8, 2006, at 12 (“Once a refuge for
downtown denizens fleeing floodwaters, Beacon Hill has been designated a Conservation
District . . . (Think of it as Historic District lite).”); O’Connell, supra note 43 (“Zoning policies
such as Raleigh’s historic district ‘lite’ and Dallas’ use of neighborhood stabilization overlays
were presented as alternative ways to preserve community character without as many
regulations.”); Thomas J. Walsh, Penn Treaty Tower, Navy Yard Updates, PLANPHILLY (Feb.
19, 2008), http://planphilly.com/articles/2008/02/19/2740 (quoting a city planning official
who describes conservation districts as “Historic District Lite”). Local legislatures, zoning
commissions, and neighbors also choose to adopt neighborhood conservation districts in lieu
of historic districts when they perceive historic-district regulations as onerous. MCCLURG,
supra note 36, at 7–8 (recounting that residents “grew concerned that local historic designation
. . . would essentially bring an end to a long tradition of architectural creativity” and that
residents thus considered whether a neighborhood conservation district might better serve their
needs); Eric R. Danton, New Panel To Consider Creating Village District, 7 Members To
Include Property Owners in Area Studied, HARTFORD COURANT, January 3, 2001, at B1
(“[T]he committee recommended against creating [a historic] district because of stringent
requirements that home and business owners would have to follow. Instead, committee
members suggested studying a village district that would give property owners more latitude
in how they use their land and buildings.”).
57. Lovelady, supra note 10, at 148.
58. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
59. See Lovelady, supra note 10, at 154–55 (“Some districts amount to a traditional
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historic-district status to subject renovations and construction to a design-review
process just as stringent as that required in local historic districts. Thus, conservation
districts permit residents and regulators to bypass legislative limitations on the use
of onerous design criteria in historic districts.
This Part will establish and critique the defining characteristics of neighborhood
conservation districts. The first characteristic, a design standard that requires
alterations and new construction to be consistent with structures in the vicinity of the
proposed development, is a misguided attempt to safeguard cultural stability.60 The
second characteristic, sublocal governance, represents an effort, ultimately
unsuccessful, to ensure that the neighborhood conservation regulations reflect a
community-based consensus.61 In addition, this Part will describe how regulators and
interest groups use design standards and sublocal governance to resist market forces
that might otherwise increase the availability and decrease the cost of housing in
desirable neighborhoods.
A. Cultural Stability in Practice: Zoning as Taxidermy62
Conservation-district regulations codify aesthetic assessments grounded in a
purported desire for stability.63 For example, Cambridge’s design-review process

[historic district] with rigorous design review and guidelines based on the Secretary of the
Interior’s Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties.”); id. at 157 (“[T]he line between
historic and conservation districts is not always easy to draw.”).
60. Advocates and regulators make no secret of their intentions in adopting neighborhood
conservation districts. They aim to “conserve neighborhoods” through zoning and, in their
attempt to do so, they design neighborhood conservation zoning regulations to mirror existing
neighborhood land use and architecture. This Part, based on a close reading of a few
conservation-district schemes, examines how those regulations work to conserve existing land
use and architecture patterns, with the ultimate goal of understanding what the intended and
unintended consequences of these regulations might be.
61. These attempts to involve the “community” succeed and fail to varying degrees.
Conservation districts vary as to how the “community” is defined. As discussed further below,
because some neighborhood conservation districts require a majority or supermajority of
property owners rather than residents to approve a neighborhood conservation district, the
“community” that adopts and controls a neighborhood conservation district may not include
everyone who lives, works, or spends time in the proposed district. See infra Part III.B.
62. This use of the term “taxidermy” is borrowed from Jane Jacobs. See infra note 91 and
accompanying text.
63. Proponents routinely cite “neighborhood preservation” or “cultural heritage” as their
primary motivation for adoption of a neighborhood conservation district. See, e.g., KAN. CITY, MO.,
ZONING & DEV. CODE § 88-205-03-B (Supp. 2015) (“Neighborhood overlay districts seek to
preserve an area’s cultural, architectural, and aesthetic ambience.”); DALL., TEX., DEV. CODE
§ 51A-4.505(b) (Supp. 2014) (“[T]he conservation district is established to provide a means
of conserving an area’s distinctive atmosphere or character by protecting or enhancing its
significant architectural or cultural attributes.”); SUSAN HANZLIK, CITY OF TOPEKA, KAN.,
NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS, available at http://www.topeka.org/pdfs
/NCDBrochure.pdf (“Helping to preserve your neighborhood’s unique character and
architectural heritage.”); Community Planning and Design, SCENIC P ITTSBURGH,
http://www.scenicpittsburgh.org/community-planning-and-design.html (“Neighborhood
conservation districts are an effective way of . . . emphasizing a neighborhood’s cultural
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requires the neighborhood conservation-district commission to “consider, among
other things, the historic and architectural value and significance of the site or
structure, the general design, arrangement, texture and material of the features
involved, and the relation of such features to similar features of structures in the
surrounding area.”64 Existing buildings set the standard for determining whether a
proposed development is aesthetically acceptable. 65 This context-based aesthetic
review, intended, for example, to “preserve an area’s cultural, architectural, and
aesthetic ambience,”66 is consistent with the scholarly call to incorporate aesthetics
in land-use regulations so long as those aesthetic considerations are based in cultural
preservation.67
Each neighborhood conservation district pursues the goal of cultural stability in
one of two ways. “Preservation model” conservation districts subject new
construction and alterations to a design-review process.68 “Neighborhood planning
model” conservation districts require new construction and alterations to be
consistent with precise, detailed regulations that include but are not limited to
typical-use and bulk regulations.69 Both approaches require all new construction,
alterations, and additions to be consistent with the existing built environment in the
relevant district. 70
A typical “preservation model” ordinance in Noank, Connecticut, requires that,
prior to construction of any structure or exterior renovation, a local commission must
determine
that the overall architectural character of the proposed site and building
design is in harmony with the neighborhood in which such activity is

attributes . . . .”).
64. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.78.220(A) (Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
65. Id. (“In the case of new construction or additions to existing structures a
commission shall consider the appropriateness of the size and shape of the structure both in
relation to the land area upon which the structure is situated and to structures in the vicinity
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
66. KAN. CITY, MO., ZONING & DEV. CODE § 88-205-03-B.
67. See, e.g., COSTONIS, supra note 22; Costonis, supra note 20, at 395–418, 430–32;
Rose, supra note 35, at 494. In fact, in a brief section of Icons and Aliens, Costonis is explicitly
supportive of the then-nascent neighborhood conservation movement. COSTONIS, supra note
22, at 24–25; see also MCCLURG, supra note 36, at 15 (“In the category of the classic is lawyer
John Costonis’ book Icons and Aliens: Law, Aesthetics and Environmental Change, which
examines the legal basis of aesthetic control, as well as its often subjective nature.”).
68. Lovelady, supra note 10, at 157.
69. Id. at 161–62.
70. MILLER, supra note 45, at 8 (quoting a planner in the Dallas, Texas, planning
department as saying that Dallas’s conservation-district regulations “are meant to be
‘tailor-made to the neighborhood and what it collectively wants to conserve’”). The line
between the two categories is not fixed, and some districts include elements of both categories:
“Over time, the distinctions between preservation and planning-based conservation districts
are becoming blurred as communities look for and develop solutions that respond to the
specific needs of individual neighborhoods.” Rebecca Lubens & Julia Miller, Protecting Older
Neighborhoods Through Conservation District Programs, 21 PRESERVATION L. REP. 1001,
1011 (2002–03).
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taking place, or accomplishes a transition in character between areas of
unlike character; protects property values in the neighborhood, and
preserves and enhances the beauty of the community, its historical
integrity and architecture.71
Design review requires that a property owner consult applicable design guidelines in
the process of designing a renovation or new building. The final design, including
details regarding materials, roof design, site plans, landscaping plans, and window
and door design, is often required to be submitted to a commission for review. Only
upon favorable review by the design-review commission is a project eligible for
issuance of a building permit. One representative ordinance, in Nashville, charges a
local board with determining, among other things, “[t]he appropriateness of the exterior
architectural design and features of, and appurtenances related to, any new structure or
improvement” and “[t]he appropriateness of exterior alterations and repairs to an
existing structure.”72 Even if a proposed structure meets all of the use, setback, height,
floor-area ratio, and other requirements of the underlying zoning ordinance, it can be
denied a building permit for failure to survive the design-review process.
“Neighborhood planning model” conservation districts do not require design
review but, instead, impose detailed design standards based on existing context. In
Dallas’s M Streets East Conservation District, for example, the minimum front-yard
setback for any given block is determined by averaging the setbacks of all the houses
on the block on the date on which the district was established.73 An appendix to the
ordinance includes the address of each house in the district and its front yard setback.
Based on that background information, it then establishes the setback that is
applicable to each block. In the neighboring M Streets Conservation District,
neighbors and the city’s planning department determined that eight architectural
styles (High Tudor, Tudor, Craftsman, Spanish Revival, Minimal Traditional,
Neo-Colonial, Ranch, and Contemporary) prevailed in the neighborhood.74 The M
Streets ordinance identifies the architectural style of each and every house in the
neighborhood. Much as Euclid set out a hierarchy of uses with single-family
residences perched at the top and permitted in all zones, the M Streets Conservation
District establishes a hierarchy of architectural styles. High Tudors, which sit at the
top of the hierarchy, can be demolished “only if the cost of bringing the house into
compliance with all applicable building code requirements using materials similar to
the original materials is greater than 80 percent of the structure’s value . . . .”75 Any
other style may be demolished at the owner’s option.76 Any new construction must
be in the High Tudor style,77 typical of houses built in the neighborhood in the 1920s,

71. GROTON, CONN., ZONING ORDINANCE FOR THE NOANK FIRE DISTRICT § 2.26, at 9
(2012) (on file with author).
72. NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.40.410(C)(1),
(3) (Supp. 2014).
73. Dall., Tex., Ordinance 25,474 exhibit A § d(3) (Jan. 13, 2004). The ordinance also
contains a list of the average front yard setbacks of buildings on each block. Id. exhibit B, app. D.
74. See Dall., Tex., Ordinance 25,116 exhibit A (Nov. 12, 2002).
75. Id. exhibit A § g.
76. Id. exhibit B § 6.
77. Id. exhibit A § e(2).
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unless the new construction is replacing a demolished Craftsman—in which case the
new construction can be in the Craftsman style.78 Any house may be renovated, but
it must be renovated according to its original style or the High Tudor style, per the
definitions and guidelines set forth in the ordinance.79 For example, “Minimal
Traditional houses must have a cross-gabled roof with low to moderate roof slope
between 30 degrees and 45 degrees, and a single projecting front-facing entryway.”
Such homes must include a “front porch entry.”80 The ordinance regulates materials,
roof design, porch design, and any other characteristics that the city council
determined to be essential elements of each style. These very precise standards are
all based on the neighborhood study undertaken prior to passage of the ordinance.
The Dallas and Noank ordinances are concerned with consistency—that is, that
new development be consistent with the past construction—but they take very
different approaches. The Dallas ordinances define consistency in rigorous detail.
There is no design-review process by which an administrative body has latitude to
determine whether a proposed construction project is consistent with the existing
neighborhood fabric. The regulations are, instead, enforced by staff within city hall
charged with issuing zoning permits and building permits.
The Noank ordinance also requires consistency, but it does so with significantly
less detail. Instead, it simply provides that new construction must be “in harmony
with the neighborhood.”81 Whether proposed renovation or construction is
harmonious is determined at the discretion of the zoning commission. The zoning
commission undertakes a design review in which eleven architectural elements are
considered. The proposed construction or renovation must “relate to” the structures
within two hundred feet on all eleven elements, which include scale, “[r]hythm of
solids to voids in the façade,” and “[b]uildings and [s]tructures and [r]elationship of
[m]aterials [t]o [b]e [u]sed.”82 The Dallas M Streets ordinance provides detailed
requirements as to roof shape, for example: “The roof of new houses must be
side-gabled with a roof slope between 45 degrees and 70 degrees. Hipped roofs are
not allowed. The maximum overhang for eaves is 18 inches.”83 By contrast, Noank
simply provides that the “[r]elationship of roof shapes . . . should be compared to the
majority of roofs within two hundred feet of the lot.”84 The regulations are, unlike
those in Dallas, vague, perhaps purposefully.85 The administrative body charged with
design review has great latitude to determine whether a proposed construction project
is permissible. While the Dallas ordinances are quite granular, the Noank ordinance
is perhaps unconstitutionally vague.86
In both the planning and preservation models, neighborhood conservation
districts, as their name suggests, provide for conservation of a neighborhood’s

78. Id. exhibit A § i(1)(A).
79. Id. exhibit A § h.
80. Id. exhibit A § k(3), (5).
81. GROTON, CONN., ZONING ORDINANCE FOR THE NOANK FIRE DISTRICT § 2.26, at 9
(2012) (on file with author).
82. Id. §§ 2.26.3.4, .6, at 10–11.
83. Dall., Tex., Ordinance 25,116 exhibit A § e(5).
84. GROTON, CONN., ZONING ORDINANCE FOR THE NOANK FIRE DISTRICT § 2.26.3.8, at 12.
85. See infra notes 274–77 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.

2015]

ZONING AS TAXIDERMY

1539

existing architectural and land-use fabric without regard to historical or architectural
merit. In some places, as in Noank, the regulations simply provide that design review
should be undertaken with conservation as the primary goal.87 In other places, as in
the M Streets neighborhoods, the regulations consist of standards divined from the
existing land-use and architectural patterns.88 In both cases, the result is zoning
regulations that do not take into account market dynamics, demand for housing,
population growth, or demographic trends.
In an effort to impose an objective standard for aesthetic review, scholars have
advocated “cultural stability” as a basis for any aesthetic regulation.89 Neighborhood
conservation districts, in their prioritization of conservation over competing goals,
aspire to this approach. Neighborhood conservation districts are not historic districts,
motivated by architectural-preservation goals and circumscribed by the strictures in
historic-preservation statutes.90 Nor are neighborhood conservation districts
established to further traditional land-use planning goals such as protection of health
and general welfare. Instead, their sole goal is to achieve stasis, to preserve the
neighborhood as it exists on the day that the regulation is adopted.
The preservation movement has long struggled with the difficulty of attaining
through regulation the same urban fabrics that grew organically from the market
attributes of bygone eras. Jane Jacobs, the perhaps-unintentional matriarch of historic
preservation and neighborhood conservation legislation, predicted the difficulty of
preserving or conserving neighborhood fabric; she worried that regulation of urban
environments might amount to taxidermy, which “goes too far when the specimens
put on display are exhibitions of dead, stuffed cities.”91 Jacobs argued that
in a closed society, a technologically hampered society, or an arrested
society, either hard necessity or tradition and custom can enforce on
everyone a disciplined selectivity of purposes and materials, a discipline
by consensus on what those materials demand of their organizers, and a
disciplined control over the forms thereby created.92
Jacobs did not provide examples of “closed,” “technologically hampered,” or
“arrested” societies, but she certainly did not believe that the modern United States
or any of its cities qualified.93 Instead, she believed that “to embody tradition or to

87. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 47–59.
91. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 373 (Vintage Books
1992) (1961) (“[T]axidermy can be a useful and decent craft. However, it goes too far when
the specimens put on display are exhibitions of dead, stuffed cities. Like all attempts at art
which get far away from the truth and which lose respect for what they deal with, this craft of
city taxidermy becomes, in the hands of its master practitioners, continually more picky and
precious.”); see also Karrie Jacobs, Jane Jacobs Revisited, METROPOLIS (Aug. 2006),
http://www.metropolismag.com/August-2006/Jane-Jacobs-Revisited/.
92. JACOBS, supra note 91, at 373.
93. See id. at 373–74 (“But this [hardened control of architectural materials and forms] is
not the case with us. . . . We can’t be like that because the limitations on possibilities and the
strictures on individuals in such societies extend much beyond the materials and conceptions
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express (and freeze) harmonious consensus” is not the “constructive use” to which
cities ought to be put.94 Writing about historic-preservation laws more than thirty
years ago and wrestling with this same problem, Carol Rose observed,
Given the strong influence of urban renewal projects on historic districts,
it is no surprise that the districts sometimes share with urban renewal
projects an overplanned quality and an imperious suppression of variety
that may ruin the liveliness and diversity of an urban neighborhood.
Historic district regulation, by narrowing a builder’s design choices to a
few approved styles, can freeze a community’s architectural character to
reflect some quasi-mythic time in the past, at the cost of creative
contributions by current residents.95
Neighborhood conservation regulations exacerbate this problem. While few
neighborhoods are eligible for historic-district designation, conservation districts can
be implemented almost anywhere.96 Adoption of neighborhood conservation districts
disrupts the process of creative destruction that has long characterized American city
building.97 Too often, policy makers and city residents assume that urban growth
must happen outward—that after a neighborhood is developed, it is “built-out” and
its density should not change. According to that understanding, new development
accommodating population growth and immigration happens only in previously
undeveloped areas, successive outer rings surrounding cities. But growing outward
onto farmland is just one way in which urban areas accommodate new residents.
Redevelopment and infill development have long been important to urban
development patterns and have allowed cities and suburbs to accommodate
population growth in the very places that are desirable for people to live.98
Redeveloping and rebuilding already-developed areas allows homeowners,
renters, commercial interests, real-estate developers, and land-use planners to
reimagine the highest and best use of land by anticipating future needs. A parcel of

used in creating works of art from the grist of everyday life. . . . [W]e are too adventurous,
inquisitive, egoistic and competitive to be a harmonious society of artists by consensus, and,
what is more, we place a high value upon the very traits that prevent us from being so. Nor is
this the constructive use we make of cities or the reason we find them valuable: to embody
tradition or to express (and freeze) harmonious consensus.”).
94. Id. at 374. Jacobs cautioned against approaching a city or neighborhood as “a larger
architectural problem, capable of being given order by converting it into a disciplined work of
art . . . .” Id. at 373. Her writings on the subject do not leave much doubt about what she would
think of the M Streets East ordinance in Dallas, for example.
95. Rose, supra note 35, at 509 (footnote omitted).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 51–53.
97. See generally MAX PAGE, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MANHATTAN, 1900–1940
(1999).
98. See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION
MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 223–46 (2011) (discussing
the development of Chicago and Atlanta, among other cities); Virginia McConnell & Keith
Wiley, Infill Development: Perspectives and Evidence from Economics and Planning (Res.
for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 10-13, 2010) (describing state and local policies to
promote infill development).
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land on what would later become Manhattan’s Fifth Avenue may have been best used
as a portion of a farm in 1800.99 When it was first developed, Fifth Avenue above
Fourteenth Street was a single-family neighborhood.100 At that time, the best use of
a Fifth Avenue parcel may have been as a mansion, a brownstone, or an attached
single-family house. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, developers sought
to change the Avenue’s residential areas to commercial and mixed-use areas.101 By
1910, half of the fifty-eight brownstones that had been located on Fifth Avenue
between Thirty-Fourth and Forty-Second Streets in 1902 had been demolished.102
The rest were demolished, and replaced with commercial buildings, by 1930.103
Often, buildings were torn down just a few years after they were originally
constructed.104 Were it not for the constant rebuilding of Manhattan and infill
development increasing the density of already-developed neighborhoods, the Upper
East Side would not have existed in the state in which it was “preserved” in 1981,
when it was designated a landmark. The Upper East Side has existed in a series of
wildly differing iterations over the last three centuries. Rebuilding and redeveloping
enabled Manhattan to meet evolving needs as New York City grew, architectural
styles and technological capabilities evolved, and the needs of homeowners, renters,
and commercial interests changed over time. Manhattan provides just one lens
through which to view the importance of infill development to neighborhoods that
many now consider historic. But the same pattern of development and redevelopment
is apparent in urban areas across the country.105
Cultural stability does not exist in a vacuum, and it must be considered alongside
other competing goals. Even if stability is a relevant consideration in policy making,
it cannot be the only consideration. Indeed, changing cultural norms, immigration,
population growth, increasing diversity, and other evolving factors will often require
society to reconsider whether stability is a worthy policy goal.106 Neighborhood
conservation districts, particularly where they are adopted extensively across a city (as

99. Fifth Avenue did not exist above Fourteenth Street until the 1850s. PAGE, supra note
97, at 26.
100. Id. at 28.
101. Id. at 24–28.
102. Id. at 26.
103. Id.
104. See id. As historian Max Page carefully details in The Creative Destruction of
Manhattan, 1900–1940, the breathtaking pace of redevelopment in Manhattan in the early
twentieth century was fraught and not without growing pains. Entrenched interests, including
the Vanderbilt family, sought (unsuccessfully, in the case of Fifth Avenue) to prevent
demolitions and rebuilding in favor of preserving Midtown Manhattan as a neighborhood of
single-family homes—both brownstones and freestanding mansions. One wonders what the
result might have been had the Vanderbilts had at their disposal the land-use regulatory tools
available today.
105. See GLAESER, supra note 98, at 231–38, 241–44 (describing the development patterns
of several American cities).
106. See generally 3 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 1, § 38:27 (“The policy considerations—
and, derivatively, the legal principles—governing rezonings can be usefully conceptualized as
attempts to reconcile the competing and conflicting goals of promoting, on the one hand,
desired stability and, on the other hand, desired flexibility in zoning.”).
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is the case in Nashville and Cambridge),107 render local and state governments unable
to respond to changing demographics, growing populations, and variable market
conditions. This inability to respond to change is an evil inherent in a land-use planning
policy that prioritizes conserving neighborhoods in their present state to the exclusion
of all other goals, goals that should be considered in the land-use planning process.
B. (Dis)empowering Communities Through Sublocal Governance
Advocates argue that neighborhood conservation districts incorporate
community-based decision-making processes.108 The primary mechanism by which
conservation districts incorporate community perspectives is sublocal governance. A
neighborhood-level institution is entrusted with one or more of the following: the
decision whether to adopt a neighborhood conservation district; the crafting of
district regulations; and, less frequently, the administration of the neighborhood
conservation district. Voices that may not be heard at the regional or local levels are
more likely to be heard at the sublocal level.
Unfortunately, neighborhood conservation districts amplify some voices but
exclude others, thus diminishing, if not obliterating, their benefits in increasing
participation. In particular, conservation districts often exclude the voices and
preferences of renters and those who live outside of the proposed district but who
may, nonetheless, be affected by its adoption.109 In addition, conservation districts
always exclude and, in fact, prohibit consideration of the needs of future housing
consumers.110 As a result, any supposed voice-enhancing benefits are undercut.
While zoning is adopted at the municipal level without formal input from each
affected neighborhood, zone, or district, neighborhood conservation districts
typically require sublocal approval. Neighborhood conservation districts are adopted
at the municipal level, but sublocal initiation or approval is a condition precedent to
adoption. For example, in Chapel Hill, the process of designating a neighborhood
conservation district can be initiated either by the town council111 or by a

107. Cambridge, Massachusetts, has four neighborhood conservation districts. See Historic
Districts and Neighborhood Conservation Districts in Cambridge, MA, CAMBRIDGE HIST.
COMMISSION, http://www2.cambridgema.gov/Historic/districts.html. Nashville, Tennessee,
has eleven neighborhood conservation districts. See MCCLURG, supra note 36, at 73.
108. See MILLER, supra note 45, at 1 (“[N]eighborhood conservation districts offer
community-based solutions aimed at protecting an area’s distinctive character.”); id. at 5
(“[H]igh emphasis is placed on neighborhood participation . . . .”); id. at 8 (“[M]ost
communities require that the process for initiating conservation district status include a
significant level of neighborhood involvement.”); id. at 9 (“A key aspect of neighborhood
conservation district programs is mandatory public participation.”). The attraction to
community-based, neighborhood-level planning is so attractive that even Edward Glaeser, a
leading advocate of land-use deregulation, falls into the trap of advocating in favor of some
limited sublocal land-use powers. See GLAESER, supra note 98, at 162.
109. See infra Part III.B.1–2.
110. See infra Part III.B.3.
111. In at least one instance, the Chapel Hill Planning Board petitioned the town council to
consider creating a neighborhood conservation district. See Memorandum from W. Calvin
Horton, Town Manager, Town of Chapel Hill, to the Mayor and Town Council (May 15, 2006),
available at http://townhall.townofchapelhill.org/agendas/2006/05/15/1/greenwood_ncd.htm.
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neighborhood-level petition.112 Upon the affirmative vote of either fifty-one percent
of the property owners (voting on a single-vote-per-parcel basis) or of the owners of
fifty-one percent of the land area within the proposed district, the local government
initiates the review process.113
Even where the authorizing ordinance does not require that conservation districts
be formally approved at the sublocal level, municipalities in practice will require
sublocal approval before adopting a design overlay. In Dallas, the ordinance does not
require sublocal approval, but the city council will not entertain adoption unless the
process is initiated at the sublocal level: “[N]eighborhood-initiated designation is in
practice the only politically feasible route.”114 Nashville’s local ordinance does not,
on its face, require any neighborhood-level input in the adoption of a neighborhood
conservation district.115 As a practical matter, however, often local governments will
not consider a neighborhood for designation unless there is sublocal support. In
Cambridge, the citywide historical commission “may begin the study of a district,
but, in general, neighborhood conservation districts develop out of residents’ concern
over issues that threaten their neighborhood’s character,”116 and the commission
appointed to evaluate designation must include sublocal representation. Connecticut,
likewise, does not require sublocal approval in order to adopt a village district, the
Connecticut analog to the neighborhood conservation district.117 As a practical
matter, however, such approval is necessary. In one Connecticut town, the planning
and zoning commission told village-district advocates that it would not take up a

112. As of February 2012, Chapel Hill suspended designation of new neighborhood
conservation districts. Neighborhoods that had initiated the process prior to that date can
proceed. Neighborhood Conservation District (NCD) Zoning Overlays, TOWN CHAPEL HILL,
http://townofchapelhill.org/town-hall/departments-services/planning-and-sustainability
/resources/neighborhood-conservation-district-ncd-zoning-overlays.
113. CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. A § 3.6.5(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 2014). A
bill recently defeated in the General Assembly of North Carolina would have required the
unanimous consent of property owners in the proposed district prior to adoption of any
regulations “relating to building design elements.” H.R. 150, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013).
Senate Bill 139 was substantially similar. See S. 139, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013). Both
bills defined “building design elements” as “exterior building color; type or style of exterior
cladding material; style or materials of roof structures or porches; exterior nonstructural
architectural ornamentation; location or architectural styling of windows and doors, including
garage doors; the number and types of rooms; and the interior layout of rooms.” Id.; see also
infra note 263.
114. MILLER, supra note 45, at 8 (citing conversation with Jim Anderson, a historic
preservation planner with the Dallas planning department).
115. See NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 17.36.100–.120
(Supp. 2014).
116. CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL COMM’N, supra note 37; see also ELIZABETH DURFEE
HENGEN & CAROLYN BALDWIN, NEIGHBORHOOD HERITAGE DISTRICTS: A HANDBOOK FOR NEW
HAMPSHIRE MUNICIPALITIES 9 (2008), available at http://www.nh.gov/nhdhr/documents
/neighborr_hert_handbook.pdf (“[E]ven with [the support of city officials], the citizens’ group
needs to be prepared to take the lead on undertaking a public awareness and education
program. The importance of such a campaign is integral to the successful establishment of a
neighborhood heritage district ordinance.”).
117. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2j (West Supp. 2014).
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proposed design overlay unless the homeowners’ association in the affected
neighborhood drafted and proposed the ordinance.118 In another, though not required
to do so by the authorizing state statute, the town appointed a committee to consider
adoption of a village district and took care to ensure that the nine members included
two homeowners and two business owners inside the proposed district.119
In addition to requiring sublocal input at the time of adoption, a subset of
neighborhood conservation districts incorporate sublocal input in the course of
exercising design review. For example, in Cambridge, the board responsible for
design review must include three residents, two of whom must be homeowners, and
a property owner, who may also be a homeowner.120 In Nashville, the design-review
board is set at the local level, but it must include at least two residents of overlay
districts and two people who are either property owners or business owners in an
overlay district.121
1. Sublocal Governance: Impacts on Efficiency
Sublocal structures allow residents and property owners to establish governance
models at the neighborhood level.122 Proponents of sublocalism argue that these
structures allow each consumer of municipal services to choose that combination of
service provision and taxation that best meets his or her needs, as originally modeled
on the local level by Charles Tiebout.123 Tiebout theorized that local governments,

118. Ann DeMatteo, Hamden PZC Lets Residents Take Lead on Village District, NEW
HAVEN REG., Apr. 18, 2009, at B1.
119. Danton, supra note 56. Similarly, the Indianapolis Historic Preservation Commission
“requests the residents to get seventy-five percent of the property owners to sign in support of
the conservation district; this is not required by the ordinance, but is done in practice.”
MCCLURG, supra note 36, at 45. And in Iowa City, “[i]n order to create a conservation district,
residents must get signatures on petitions and letters of support from the neighborhood. This
is compiled with information about the neighborhood, the issues that threaten the character of
the area, and an argument for designation.” Id. at 49.
120. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.78.160(A) (Supp. 2012).
121. The historic zoning commission is responsible for design review in neighborhood
conservation districts as well as in historic preservation districts, historic landmark districts,
and historic bed-and-breakfast homestay districts. See NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 17.36.110, 17.40.400 (Supp. 2014).
122. To date, neighborhood conservation districts have largely escaped the notice of
scholars interested in sublocal governance structures. See supra note 10. One proponent of
sublocal zoning ignores them entirely. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment
and the Future of the City, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 939 (2013). In a recent symposium, William A.
Fischel notes that neighborhood conservation districts are akin to sublocal structures such as
BIDs, but he does not consider whether sublocal governance structures facilitate participation,
nor does he consider the possible negative implications of allowing sublocal structures to
assume elements of zoning authority. Fischel, supra note 10, at 350.
123. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956). By no means is this Article intended to contribute to the overreliance on Tiebout to
explain local government phenomena. Nor does this Article purposefully avoid addressing
more recent economic scholarship that displaces or complicates the Tiebout model. Instead,
this Article posits that the extent to which Tiebout’s theory pervades thinking about zoning
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unlike the federal government, efficiently expend tax dollars on public goods because
each “consumer-voter” can move to whichever municipality provides his or her ideal
combination of service provision and taxation.124 While Tiebout himself
acknowledged that certain practical realities limit the real world application of his
theory,125 and economists and legal scholars have identified various limitations in his
model,126 that model has nonetheless served as the dominant theoretical baseline for
local-government and land-use law scholarship in recent decades.127
Tiebout’s model assumes that a metropolitan area includes a large number of
small municipalities, each with a set revenue and expenditure pattern.128 Cities, being
neither small nor homogenous, complicate application of Tiebout’s model.129
Richard Briffault proposes that, in this context, sublocal structures play a role in
increasing Tieboutian efficiency.130 In a large heterogeneous city, each sublocal area
is smaller and more homogeneous than the city as a whole. Sublocal “institutions—
which include enterprise zones, tax increment finance districts, special zoning
districts, and business improvement districts—provide for a variety of territorially
based differences in taxation, services, or regulation within individual cities.”131 As
a result, proponents of sublocal institutions argue that these institutions provide the
consumer of municipal services an array of choices within a given municipality.132

and land use, not the inherent correctness of that theory, is a possible explanation for the rising
popularity of sublocal zoning power and design-review authority.
124. Id. at 418; see also Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban
Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503 (1997) (Tiebout argues that “[t]he multiplicity of
local governments in an area means that, as long as each locality is free to adopt its own mix
of services, regulations, and taxes, area residents will have a variety of packages of local
government actions to choose among in determining where to live.”).
125. Tiebout, supra note 123, at 418–19 (model assumes that governmental “revenue and
expenditure patterns” are fixed, “consumer-voters” are mobile, their movements are not
restricted by employment or other factors, there are a large number of diverse communities
from which each “consumer-voter” can choose, “consumer-voters” have all necessary
knowledge to make an informed choice, and there are no externalities resulting from any one
municipality’s choices); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 415 (1990) (“Tiebout’s theory is one of interlocal
movement. It does not address the internal operations of urban government, local political
institutions or local political activity.”).
126. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J.
201 (1997) (describing theoretical and practical problems with Tiebout’s model); David
Schleicher, Local Government’s “Law and ___” Problem, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1951, 1964
(2013) (decrying the failure of local-government scholars to look beyond the Tiebout model
when discussing “the economic study of local government and cities”).
127. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 39–71 (2001); Stahl,
supra note 122, at 942 n.4 (noting the influence of Tiebout’s theory).
128. Tiebout, supra note 123, at 418–19.
129. Briffault, supra note 124, at 504–06.
130. Id. at 530.
131. Id. at 508.
132. Id. (“The more recent development of new forms of submunicipal political
institutions, however, suggests new possibilities for ameliorating the basic tension between
the assumptions of the Tiebout model and the position of big cities in the local government
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While Briffault does not consider neighborhood conservation districts, these
districts fit neatly into his model. Like business improvement districts, tax-increment
financing districts, special zoning districts, and enterprise zones—the institutions
described by Briffault—a neighborhood conservation district “tends to treat the
sublocal zone or district as a distinctive actor with a formal legal-political identity
rather than as an undifferentiated part of the city.”133
If neighborhood conservation districts work as theorists would hope, informed
homebuyers or developers in Nashville, Cambridge, or Dallas can vote with their feet
between a neighborhood with a conservation district and one without such a
district.134 And of the neighborhoods with conservation districts, the informed
purchaser can choose a district with guidelines that are attractive to her. Fans of
Craftsman bungalows can purchase homes in Nashville’s Richland-West End
Addition,135 aficionados of “mid to late 19th-century workers’ and suburban
housing” will be especially attracted to Cambridge’s Half Crown-Marsh
Neighborhood Conservation District,136 and the M Streets neighborhood will be
particularly desirable to lovers of High Tudors.137
2. Sublocal Governance: Impacts on Policy
While many have considered whether sublocal structures produce efficiency by
facilitating the Tieboutian model within a municipality, whether they better advance
citizen preferences is a separate inquiry. Briffault describes the impact that sublocal
governance can have on advancing “voice.”138 Proponents of sublocal governance
argue that, procedurally, it gives voice to those who might otherwise be silenced in

system.” (footnote omitted)); Stahl, supra note 122, at 943 (describing sublocal institutions as
“efforts to import into the city the most attractive features of suburban governance by
devolving power to the smaller scale of the neighborhood”).
133. Briffault, supra note 124, at 524.
134. But see infra notes 266–68 and accompanying text (regarding the problem of
uninformed consumers and the lack of transparency inherent to neighborhood conservation
districts).
135. See METRO. HISTORIC ZONING COMM’N, METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON
CNTY., RICHLAND-WEST END ADDITION NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION ZONING 6 (rev. ed.
2012), available at http://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/MHZC/docs/Preservation
%20Permits/Maps%20and%20Guidelines/RWE%20Addition%202012_revised.pdf.
136. See HALF CROWN-MARSH NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DIST. CONSOLIDATION STUDY
COMM., HALF CROWN-MARSH NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICT CONSOLIDATION STUDY
5 (2006), available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/hc_marsh_consol_report.pdf.
137. See Dall., Tex., Ordinance 25,116 exhibit A § g (Nov. 12, 2002), available at
http://dallascityhall.com/departments/sustainabledevelopment/historicpreservation/_layouts/15
/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/departments/sustainabledevelopment/historicpreservation/DCH
%20documents/pdf/MStreet_GreenlandHills.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1.
138. Briffault, supra note 124, at 505 (“The small size of local units makes it easier for
citizens to voice their views to their local government and their fellow local citizens, to respond
to each other’s concerns, and to deliberate concerning important local public matters. . . . The
resulting sense of ‘citizen effectiveness’ may lead to more participation, which, by reinforcing
the sense of effectiveness, can maintain and increase participation.” (footnote omitted)).
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local, state, or national debates.139 In advancing voice, sublocal governance might,
provided it does not have exclusionary effects, result in substantive benefits.140 It is
possible that sublocal procedures can ensure that neighborhood conservation districts
are grounded in community desires and values. The process of creating and
interpreting the guidelines can itself result in community members coming together
to tell the story of their neighborhood.141 That storytelling takes regulatory form, and
the regulations embody the community building that both impelled and resulted from
the adoption of a neighborhood conservation district.142

139. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 245, 257–58 (2002) (noting that limitations on federal power serve to facilitate
democracy because state and local governments are easier for citizens to hold accountable);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal
Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 209 (2005) (“The extraordinary plethora of plebiscitary
procedures, neighborhood consent requirements, lay boards and elected bodies that govern
local governments under state law . . . indicates a level of public participation at an entirely
different level than that provided by federal administrative law.”); Matthew J. Parlow, Civic
Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic
Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 145 (2008) (“[L]ocal governments constitute the most
viable avenue for engaging the public in the decision- and policy-making processes . . . .”);
Lovelady, supra note 10, at 175 (“When preservationists desire neighborhood protection but
encounter opposition from property rights advocates or residents fearing increased costs,
NCDs offer a compromise . . . .”).
140. But see infra Part III.B.
141. “Procedurally, the very process of community self-definition, including the
procedures of modern historic preservation law, brings neighbors together in mutual education
and mutual aid, helping to prevent a paralyzing sense of individual powerlessness.” Rose,
supra note 35, at 494. Costonis, on the other hand, ignores process and, instead, places the
burden on legislators to determine whether a proposed aesthetic regulation is truly
accomplishing a widely supported community interest in cultural stability: “[P]olicy-makers
should examine the claimed associational bonds between the resource and the community to
determine whether protecting the resource will advance community-wide identity and stability
values.” Costonis, supra note 20, at 434. For Costonis, this examination requires legislators’
confirmation that the desire to protect an aesthetic resource must be widely held. As he says,
“[i]f the ‘objectivity’ of aesthetic standards resides in their consistency with patterns of
community preference, the inquiry should focus upon the prevalence or absence of these
patterns.” Id. at 435. But Costonis does not propose any check, other than the standard
legislative process, to ensure that aesthetic land-use regulations meet the otherwise rigorous
standard he establishes. He entrusts legislators and regulators to make a determination that a
preference for a proposed aesthetic regulation is widely held in precisely the same way that
legislators approach any policy decision, by reviewing “evidence marshalled through hearings,
staff studies, and similar sources [to determine whether] the claimed concordance of the
initiative with actual or reasonably likely community-wide preferences” can be verified. Id.
Costonis acknowledges that he requires of aesthetic regulations no more process-related
checks and balances than are required of legislative action generally: “The inquiry, in short,
should parallel the one regularly conducted by legislators in the zoning and eminent domain
fields to determine whether a proposed initiative accords with a ‘public’ purpose or merely
advances the ‘private’ interest of an individual or a group.” Id. at 435–36 (footnotes omitted).
142. See Rose, supra note 35, at 494.
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The sanguine theoretical picture painted here is muddied by the fact that sublocal
governance generally and neighborhood conservation districts specifically prioritize
some community voices over others.143 Unfortunately, neighborhood conservation
districts’ voice-enhancing benefits are undone by their exclusionary features. For
example, Cambridge’s ordinance prioritizes the involvement of property owners, and
homeowners in particular, over that of renters in designation of a neighborhood
conservation district and in developing the regulations applicable to that district.144
The designation process in Cambridge, typical of the designation process elsewhere,
must include a study of the proposed district, memorialized in a written report.145 The
study and report are conducted by an appointed committee that must include at least
one resident of the proposed district and at least one property owner in the proposed
district.146 Once a district is designated, a sublocal commission is responsible for
conducting a design review of each proposed construction or renovation project in
the district. Property owners receive even more preference here than they do in the
designation process. The five members must be (a) three district residents, two of
whom must be homeowners; (b) a neighborhood property owner, who may be a
homeowner; and (c) a member of the Cambridge Historical Commission.147 By
prioritizing property owners’ voices and excluding renters as well as those who live
outside of the proposed district, conservation districts undermine the participation
benefits that might otherwise result from neighborhood-level decision-making
processes. Furthermore, by emphasizing context to the exclusion of other policy
goals, conservation districts prohibit consideration of the needs of future housing
consumers, again excluding key voices and undermining the community-centered
goals espoused by conservation-district advocates.148
C. A Tool for Resisting Development Pressures in Desirable Housing Markets
Advancing cultural stability through aesthetics results in land-use regulations that
preserve existing architectural context. These regulations prevent property owners
from developing buildings that might accommodate evolving preferences, thus
disrupting the ability of the market to respond to consumer demand. Existing
homeowners exert control over land-use regulations disproportionate to their
numbers.149 And they want their neighborhoods to remain untouched by
development. After all, they expressed a preference for the existing neighborhood
fabric when they purchased their homes. The neighborhood conservation district
provides a regulatory mechanism for homeowners to freeze development patterns
and to replicate private-law design-review standards typical in suburban

143. The inevitable question raised in this section—“Who is the community?”—is
discussed in Part III.B, infra.
144. See CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.78.160 (Supp. 2012).
145. Id. § 2.78.180.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 2.78.160(A). Delegating design-review authority to a sublocal commission raises
constitutional questions. These are discussed in greater detail in note 241, infra.
148. See infra Part III.B.
149. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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subdivisions.150 Imposing private-law design-review standards would require all of the
property owners to submit to a restrictive covenant that would require their unanimous
consent. Some property owners may flat-out reject yielding control of the use of their
land. Others will, quite reasonably, require compensation before they do so. Regulatory
aesthetic review, on the other hand, requires neither unanimity nor compensation. In
addition, it permits homeowners to resist market forces toward higher-density uses,
whether those uses are multifamily rentals or large single-family homes.151
Neighborhood conservation districts have been used almost exclusively in
residential areas.152 As a result, conservation districts impact housing markets and,
therefore, housing prices. That simple fact should worry those who believe that
housing affordability is an appropriate goal for land-use policy. In some cases, the
applicable local ordinance limits the adoption of neighborhood conservation districts
to residential areas.153 In other cases, commercial and office districts are eligible for
designation, but no such designations have been made. If concern for historic
preservation motivated adoption of neighborhood conservation districts, one would
expect to see conservation districts in both residential and nonresidential areas.154
Factors other than the desire to protect historic communities cause neighborhood
conservation districts to be limited, largely, to residential areas. These same factors
have led policymakers and scholars to defer to homeowners in the course of crafting
land-use regulations.
First, there is a stronger compulsion to preserve residential neighborhoods, the
places where people live. Our legal system recognizes and supports an attachment to
owner-occupied homes that often exceeds their pure economic value.155 Zoning, tax,
and other laws treat owner-occupied homes favorably because they are bound up
with the personhood of the owner-occupant.156 Owner-occupied homes are “markers

150. See infra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
152. MILLER, supra note 45, at 1.
153. See, e.g., BOISE, IDAHO, BOISE MUNICIPAL CODE § 11-05-02(1)(A) (permitting
adoption in nonresidential neighborhoods but stating that “[a] conservation overlay district is
usually applied to residential neighborhoods”); CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES app.
A § 3.6.5 (Supp. 2014).
154. Cf. Rose, supra note 35, at 504–06 (noting that a major impetus for the establishment
of historic districts was to encourage business investment in particular areas and to protect the
tourism industry).
155. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 996–1002
(1982) (discussing homes and cars as paradigmatic examples of “personhood property” that
are given greater protections than other forms of property).
156. “[I]n our social context a house that is owned by someone who resides there is
generally understood to be toward the personal end of the continuum. There is both a positive
sense that people are bound up with their homes and a normative sense that this is not
fetishistic.” Id. at 987 (footnote omitted). But neighborhood conservation districts cannot be
analyzed solely as a form of protection of personhood property. Certainly, conservation
districts arise out of a desire to protect some people’s personhood property (i.e., owning a
home in a neighborhood with certain defined characteristics). They accomplish that goal,
however, by limiting others’ personhood property (i.e., owning a home that can be demolished,
renovated, and altered as one likes). This tension can be seen in design-review meetings, in
which regulators consider relevant whether a property belongs to an owner-occupant or a
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of a homeowner’s identity.”157 Even properties that appear to be interchangeable, like
the mass-produced Cape Cods of Levittown, New York, are, over time,
individualized to meet the particular needs and desires of their occupants “to the point
where [decades after Levittown was first developed] the interiors and exteriors did
not even resemble each other.”158 By contrast, most commercial property is owned
for the purpose of collecting rents. The initial design and any renovations are
intended to maximize profitability and cash flows. The typical commercial-property
owner should be indifferent as between owning his or her property and receiving, in
its stead, an amount equal to the present value of the net cash flows the owner expects
to receive from the property. As a result, the emotional response to architectural
changes and development pressures in commercial districts, where property is
fungible, is less potent, and commercial districts are less likely to be targeted by
voters and lawmakers for conservation.
Second, homeowners exert influence disproportionate to their numbers in local
land-use policy making.159 Homeowners’ outsized interest in local land-use policy
motivates them to advocate and achieve policy goals that may be unavailable to
others, such as commercial property owners or those who enjoy shopping in business
districts.160 Even where homeowners are a minority of the voting populace, their
significant financial self-interest motivates them to assemble outsized political
power.161 As a result, they are in a strong position to advocate for any land-use tool
that they believe will protect and enhance the value of their property. Private-law
design-review processes are one such tool. These private agreements, imposed
through restrictive covenants, are typical in subdivisions governed by homeowners’
associations, which “have rapidly proliferated in recent decades.”162 These

nonresident landlord. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Three Systems of Land-Use Control, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 72 (1990) (“[Z]oning officials tend to be insensitive to the interests of
nonresidents, such as housing consumers and owners of undeveloped land . . . .”).
157. Brian J. Miller, Competing Visions of the American Single-Family Home: Defining
McMansions in the New York Times and Dallas Morning News, 2000–2009, 38 J. URB. HIST.
1094, 1096 (2012).
158. Id. (citing JOHN ARCHER, ARCHITECTURE AND SUBURBIA: FROM ENGLISH VILLA TO
AMERICAN DREAM HOUSE, 1690–2000 (2005); BARBARA M. KELLY, EXPANDING THE
AMERICAN DREAM: BUILDING AND REBUILDING LEVITTOWN (1993)).
159. FISCHEL, supra note 127, at 80–81. According to Fischel’s analysis, homeowners are
heavily invested in the value of their homes. For most homeowners, their home is their largest
asset, by far, and their wealth is not diversified. The typical homeowner simply cannot afford
to risk the value of his or her home. As a result, homeowners are unlikely to favor new
development that they perceive as a threat to their property values or that is likely to increase
the cost of public-services provision, thereby increasing local property taxes. Id. at 4. Whether
rental housing has these deleterious effects is not a question Fischel tackles, nor is it one that
I attempt to answer here. Two things are clear: homeowners perceive that rental housing has
negative impacts, and they act on that perception.
160. See id.
161. See Vicki Been, Josiah Madar & Simon McDonnell, Urban Land-Use Regulation:
Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014).
162. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 829; see also
Gerald Korngold, The Emergence of Private Land Use Controls in Large-Scale Subdivisions:
The Companion Story to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617,
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developments impose on all property owners and residents a “community-wide set
of conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs) control[ling] each homeowner’s
use of her own property, the use and maintenance of common property and amenities,
and other details of community life and governance.”163 CC&Rs are more expansive,
more detailed, and more onerous than traditional-use and bulk-zoning regulations.
They control “not only types of land uses but also matters of aesthetics” including
“the color of the house paint, the placement of trees and shrubbery, the size and
location of fences, the construction of decks and other housing extensions, the
parking of automobiles in streets and driveways, and the use and placement of
television antennas, among others.”164
Neighborhood conservation districts are public-law forms of CC&Rs, historically
private-law tools. Local legislators considering whether to adopt neighborhood
conservation districts have expressly acknowledged that these districts are a public
regulatory attempt to recreate CC&Rs.165 As one local legislator described the issue
in email correspondence preceding a vote on the Belmont-Hillsboro district in
Nashville,
Although I think the potential effect that the [conservation district]
overlay can achieve can be beneficial, I do think they still turn a city
neighborhood into a virtual ‘subdivision,’ something I can understand
some people not wanting to have imposed on them. Many people do not
live in subdivisions because they do not want restrictive covenants,
something that overlays do.166
Because it affects consumers’ expectations, the explosion of housing units located
in private developments encumbered by CC&Rs affects the greater housing market,
not just housing located in private developments. Even in neighborhoods not
encumbered by restrictive covenants, homeowners expect to have the authority to
control the appearance of their neighborhood based on the fact that such control has
become commonplace in the market.167 The homeowner who purchased a High
Tudor home in the M Streets neighborhood in Dallas in the 1920s may never have

619 (2001) (citing statistics that 2.58% of housing units were located in homeowners’
association developments in 1975, a percentage that increased to 14.67% in 1998).
163. Fennell, supra note 162, at 830.
164. Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal To Replace Zoning with
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827,
831 (1999).
165. See, e.g., Johnston v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 320 S.W.3d 299,
304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); see also infra note 171.
166. Johnston, 320 S.W.3d at 304 (citing council members’ e-mail correspondence in
advance of designation of the Belmont-Hillsboro neighborhood conservation district in
Nashville).
167. Homeowners who have the desire to control their neighbors’ behavior and land-use
choices have a strong financial incentive to do so. “Studies consistently demonstrate that just
about any change in the character of one’s neighborhood can have a quantifiable impact—
either positive or negative—on local property values.” Stahl, supra note 122, at 948.
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expected to be able to control the design of his neighbor’s house. The owner of that
same High Tudor home in the year 2015 will have different expectations.168
Indeed, more than one legal scholar has advocated adopting a regulatory
mechanism that will allow homeowners who live in older neighborhoods to provide
services and to control their neighbors’ use of property in a way that is more typical
of CC&R-encumbered suburban subdivisions.169 Imposing CC&Rs on a mature
neighborhood, where properties have already been developed and ownership has
been conveyed to multiple individual homeowners, would require each individual
property owner to consent to these new encumbrances on title. CC&Rs might result
in a net benefit to the neighborhood. But each individual homeowner will have
different preferences. A homeowner who does not value the predominant
architectural style or who would prefer, for example, not to be required to remove an
inoperable automobile from her front yard, will refuse to impose CC&Rs on her
property. Alternatively, quite sensibly, she will require compensation for
relinquishing rights to control her property. In such cases, the majority of neighbors
can bypass the unanimity requirement and the demand for compensation from
otherwise unwilling neighbors by proposing that their locality (or sublocality) adopt
land-use regulations that mimic CC&Rs.170 The proliferation of neighborhood
conservation districts in older communities is a response to the proliferation of
CC&Rs in newly developed communities.171

168. The notion that the desire to control one’s neighbor’s architectural and aesthetic
choices is a modern one is not uncontested. One neighbor testified before the Noank Zoning
Commission, which was acting in its capacity as a sublocal design-review board,
I would propose that you only have to look as far as New England literature of the
18th and 19th Century, starting with the Scarlet Letter, which everybody read in
tenth grade, to understand that though they were not written laws, there were
certainly social strictures, there were social behaviors—this is the land of shunning
and social regulation on what people would build, what people would wear.
Application of Thomas and Elizabeth Halsey for a Certificate of Design Appropriateness To
Construct a New Single Family Dwelling at 28 Potter Court, at 30 (Noank Fire Dist. Zoning
Comm’n July 17, 2012). Perhaps the desire is not a modern invention, but the use of
regulations and public law to effectuate that desire certainly is.
169. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 4 (2005); Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old
Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998); Fischel, supra note 10; Stahl, supra note 122, at 949–
50 (arguing in favor of sublocal zoning regulations); Wiseman, supra note 10, at 702 (“Several
scholars have accordingly suggested that public communities should be able to form their own
private homeowners’ associations and covenants.”). The sources cited by Wiseman generally
advocate for creation of sublocal institutions that provide services, however, rather than
regulate land use.
170. See Fischel, supra note 10, at 342–49; Wiseman supra note 10, at 732.
171. See, e.g., Johnston, 320 S.W.3d at 304; TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL, NORTH CAROLINA,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS, available at
http://www.townofchapelhill.org/home/showdocument?id=755 (comparing neighborhood
conservation districts to restrictive covenants); Rob Warren, Urbana City Council Discusses Tax
Rate, Neighborhood Plan, DAILY ILLINI (Oct. 24, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailyillini.com
/news/article_a2680e69-4314-5579-8287-0bdd6423d9ed.html (quoting city council member
decrying similarity between proposed conservation district plan and “the restrictive covenant of
sub-divisions”).
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That newer residential neighborhoods are already encumbered by homeowners’
association rules requiring design review may explain why neighborhood
conservation districts are typically found in older residential neighborhoods.172 There
is, perhaps, another reason why this particular regulatory tool has gained a foothold
in urban areas and streetcar suburbs, relatively dense residential communities
developed beginning in the late nineteenth century around public transportation
infrastructure.173 Older neighborhoods face growing development pressures as they
become increasingly desirable to families and empty nesters seeking walkable
neighborhoods proximate to downtown commercial districts, public transit, and—in
some towns—colleges and universities.174
The United States is now experiencing a shift in market demand for housing.175
After decades of “white flight” and decreasing population in center cities,
middle-class people and families are returning to urban neighborhoods.176
Automobile usage, measured in number of cars owned per capita and vehicle miles
traveled per capita, is in decline as people choose to live closer to their jobs or close
to transit.177 Pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods are in vogue, with brokers touting a

172. Even homeowners in subdivisions encumbered by restrictive covenants may seek to
adopt neighborhood conservation districts if they are dissatisfied with the protections offered
by the restrictive covenants. For example, restrictive covenants must be enforced privately, in
litigation initiated by neighbors or homeowners’ associations. Neighborhood conservation
districts are instead enforced by a local government, even where administration may be
sublocal. See infra note 238 and accompanying text. As neighborhood conservation districts
continue to proliferate, it is likely that they will become more common in newer suburban
subdivisions that are also encumbered by restrictive covenants. This phenomenon will echo
the evolution of zoning at the beginning of the last century. Fischel points out that early
twentieth century suburbs utilized both early zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants to
prioritize the development of owner-occupied single-family homes. William A. Fischel, An
Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 325
(2004) (“[T]here is evidence that covenants and zoning developed side-by-side. . . . Even
where they are comprehensive, covenants may not convey enough control over development
to satisfy its residents.”).
173. See DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH,
1820–2000, at 71–96 (2003); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 20–44 (1985).
174. See Eric Jaffe, The Suburbs are Dead, Long Live the Suburbs, ATLANTIC CITYLAB
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2013/08/suburbs-are-dead-long
-live-suburbs/6680/. Jed Kolko, chief economist at Trulia, a real-estate website, recently
observed that price gains on the website in 2013 were stronger in urban neighborhoods. Jed
Kolko, Home Prices Rising Faster in Cities Than in the Suburbs—Most of All in Gayborhoods,
TRULIA TRENDS (June 25, 2013), http://trends.truliablog.com/2013/06/home-prices-rising
-faster-in-cities/.
175. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 4 (“[H]ouseholds are locating in larger cities at
an increasing rate . . . although the majority of the population in urbanized areas lives in the
suburbs, in recent decades, the central city has seen small relative gains.”).
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Emily Badger, America's Driving Less, and This Evidence Suggests It’s Not
About the Economy, ATLANTIC CITYLAB (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com
/commute/2013/08/americas-driving-less-and-evidence-suggests-it-cant-be-just-about-economy
/6706/ (citing U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., MOVING OFF THE ROAD: A STATE-BY-STATE
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home’s “walk score” alongside granite countertops, en suite baths, and the local
school district’s test scores in real-estate listings.178 The development pressures
building in urban residential neighborhoods and old streetcar suburbs manifest in two
ways. First, developers seek to build rental apartments, marketed to young
professionals and college students, in neighborhoods that previously were dominated
by single-family residences.179 Second, individuals and families want larger homes
with the amenities that are typical in contemporary suburban subdivisions, in
walkable places, close to downtown districts and transit. In order to procure that
combination of amenities, homeowners and developers purchase lots with smaller
homes, typical of the times in which they were constructed, and either alter the
existing houses or replace them with larger structures.180
Conflict arises when existing homeowners, fearing change, resist new
development. Advocates of neighborhood conservation districts suffer from a
Goldilocks syndrome. Rental units are too small, resulting in too many units per acre.
McMansions181 are too big, resulting in too much built square footage per acre. The
existing single-family homes are just right. The result is that existing homeowners
embrace land-use regulations that are derived from the existing architectural context.
Resisting development pressures is evident in various materials advocating the
adoption of neighborhood conservation districts.182 For example, a commission
established by Cambridge to evaluate a new neighborhood conservation district
celebrates the role the design overlay played to disrupt development and

ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL DECLINE IN DRIVING (2013), available at http://www.uspirg.org
/sites/pirg/files/reports/Moving_Off_the_Road_USPIRG.pdf); Emily Badger, Yet More
Evidence of Peak Car, ATLANTIC CITYLAB (July 23, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com
/commute/2013/07/yet-more-evidence-peak-car/6299/ (citing MICHAEL SIVAK, UNIV. OF MICH.
TRANSP. RESEARCH INST., HAS MOTORIZATION IN THE U.S. PEAKED? PART 2: USE OF LIGHT-DUTY
VEHICLES (2013), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/98982
/102950.pdf).
178. See, e.g., LOUISE KEELY, BART VAN ARK, GAD LEVANON & JEREMY BURBANK,
DEMAND INST., THE SHIFTING NATURE OF U.S. HOUSING DEMAND 25–26 (2012), available at
http://www.demandinstitute.org/sites/default/files/blog-uploads/tdihousingdemand.pdf (“[A]
trend toward accessible locations, reflecting householders’ preference for living in areas where
they can walk to local stores and other amenities, makes certain urban areas more attractive
than the suburbs and rural areas.”).
179. See, e.g., Jenny Surane, Chapel Hill Works To Increase Affordable Rental Housing,
DAILY TAR HEEL (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2013/08
/affordable-rental-0827 (quoting local housing advocate who argued that “the problem with
the availability in affordable rental housing for Chapel Hill’s workforce began when students
moved into low-income neighborhoods throughout the town and rented homes originally
slated as single-family units”).
180. See Adrian Scott Fine & Jim Lindberg, Taming the Teardown Trend, F. NEWS (Nat’l
Trust for Historic Pres., Wash., D.C.), July–Aug. 2002, available at http://
www.preservationnation.org/information-center/sustainable-communities/creating/teardowns
/teardowns_executive_summary.pdf.
181. For a discussion of McMansions, see infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 45, at 2 (“[N]eighborhood conservation districts provide
a means to protect character-defining streetscapes in older areas threatened by new
development . . . .”).

2015]

ZONING AS TAXIDERMY

1555

redevelopment attempts in a nearby neighborhood: “In 1984, [the Half Crown area]
was secured against further development when the City Council designated it as the
Half Crown Neighborhood Conservation District.”183 A study considering adoption
of a neighborhood conservation district in a small town in the heart of North
Carolina’s growing Research Triangle is explicit in its fear of development pressures:
“[I]t is evident that the Town of Hillsborough will have to take action to prevent
neighborhoods from being overrun by developers, ensuring that development
projects are within the scale or nature of the existing homes.”184 A memorandum
from Chapel Hill Town Manager Cal Horton, responding to a neighborhood petition
to adopt a conservation district, stated, “It is reasonable to believe that the physical
and social fabric of the Greenwood [neighborhood] is being affected by infill
development pressures, [and] the character of the neighborhood could be eroded by
subdivision and new development which is unsympathetic to the existing
neighborhood in form, massing and scale.”185 In Raleigh, North Carolina, a
single-family neighborhood zoned for high-density residential development adopted
a conservation district to prevent developers from constructing the sort of
high-density residential development permitted by the zoning ordinance.186
Existing residents have long feared the development of rental housing.187 The bias
against rental housing is evident in the rhetoric of neighborhood conservation-district

183. HALF CROWN-MARSH NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DIST. CONSOLIDATION STUDY
COMM., supra note 136, at 12 (emphasis added).
184. Hilary Schoendorf, A Closer Look at Neighborhood Conservation Districts: West
Hillsborough Neighborhood, NC 7 (Apr. 13, 2007) (unpublished Master’s paper) (emphasis added),
available at https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/record;jsessionid=0142327F050AE462337D6E782236784C
?id=uuid%3A5032e816-4bbb-445c-a3d0-4c6bd81eb14f.
185. Rob Shapard, Greenwood Residents Fight Splitting of Lots, HERALD-SUN (Durham,
N.C.), Apr. 15, 2005, at 1 (alterations in original) (emphasis added), available at 2005 WLNR
6815119.
186. Lovelady, supra note 10, at 166–67; see also Elizabeth Sappenfield, Dealing With
Development Pressure: Preservation Strategies for Desirable Neighborhoods, PRESERVATION
N.C. (2008), http://web.archive.org/web/20090618142746/http://www.presnc.org/Features
/Dealing-with-Development-Pressure (“Recently the City of Raleigh Planning Department
conducted a survey of the best management practices for protecting neighborhood character
and concluded that rezoning, neighborhood conservation districts, and local historic districts
are at the top of the list.”).
187. Conventional zoning’s distaste for apartment buildings dates back to the first zoning
ordinances adopted in the United States. Despite the fact that restrictions on apartment
buildings were not at issue in the Supreme Court’s seminal zoning case, the Court nevertheless
seized the opportunity to denounce the development of apartment buildings in single-family
residential neighborhoods and, in an oft-cited diatribe against dense housing, the Court
worried that allowing even a single apartment building could act as a “parasite” and do
irreversible damage to a previously bucolic suburban setting. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926). In fact, Fischel argues that “[t]he attraction of city-wide
zoning was the security it gave to early 20th-century home-builders and home-owners [that]
[o]nce zoning was adopted, they were no longer completely uncertain whether the nearby tract
of undeveloped land or land ripe for redevelopment would be put for some use that was
incompatible with their own.” Fischel, supra note 172, at 318. While Fischel recognizes the
role that apartment buildings and rental housing played in the ubiquitous adoption of zoning
codes in municipalities across the country, he does not question the underlying assumption
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advocates. Newspaper accounts and public-hearing testimony provide plentiful
examples of conservation-district advocates expressing concern that single-family
lots will be subdivided into two or more lots,188 single-family homes will be turned
into multifamily dwellings,189 and existing homes will be razed and replaced with
high-density development.190 As one proponent of neighborhood conservation
districts in Cambridge, Maryland, wrote in his local newspaper, “The residents in the
[neighborhood conservation] district have worked very hard over the past 20 years
to promote single family home ownership. This encourages property owners to live
in and improve their properties. To allow apartment conversions would be a big step
backward for the [neighborhood conservation] district.”191 Homeowners fear that
renters will not invest in the neighborhood as homeowners would. One Chapel Hill
advocate told a local newspaper, “It’s important to take that distinction [between a
short-term student renter and a long-term neighborhood resident] into account when
looking at the issue. . . . My interest is in listening to the people who’ve invested in
the community for decades.”192 Oftentimes, apartment-style condominiums are as
troubling to existing homeowners as rental housing is.193 Homeowners are concerned
that apartment dwellers will not invest in their neighborhoods194 and that the density
of new housing threatens the “feel” of a neighborhood.195 One neighborhood in

that single-family houses and apartment buildings are “incompatible.” Id.
188. See, e.g., Matt Dees, Resident’s Plans Divide Historic Neighborhood, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 19, 2005, at B1 (“The proposed rezoning would prevent
the type of ‘minor subdivision’ for which [one local developer] has applied.”); Joe Schwartz,
Freeze in Chapel Hill Halts Development, INDEP. WEEKLY (Durham, N.C.), June 22, 2011, at
5, available at 2011 WLNR 13073237; Shapard, supra note 185 (“Greenwood residents
started organizing [in support of a conservation district] in earnest this year in reaction to a
building company’s plans to tear down a home at 907 Greenwood Road and divide the lot into
two for new homes.”).
189. See, e.g., Eric Damian Kelly, Neighborhood Integrity and Rental Housing, College
Station Texas: Consultant’s Synthesis of Issues from Meetings 2 (Feb. 4, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.cstx.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid
=3963 (“Most who spoke appeared to accept the concepts of neighborhood petitions and some
degree of neighborhood self-determination, policies that underlie the City’s new
Neighborhood Conservation District; many seemed to believe that the Neighborhood
Conservation process could be expanded to include limitations on future rental housing.”).
190. See, e.g., Mark Schultz & Meiling Arounnarath, Glen Lennox Wants Meeting, CHAPEL
HILL NEWS (Raleigh, N.C.), June 11, 2008, at A1 (“Previous requests for NCDs have sought
protections against long-term trends—duplexes, teardowns, tree clearing . . . .”).
191. Ron Berman, Reaction to Cambridge’s Comprehensive Rezoning Proposal, BANNER
(Cambridge, Md.), Aug. 7, 2013, at 5, available at 2013 WLNR 19481399.
192. Katelyn Ferral, Rules Target Student Rentals—Coalition Wants To Limit Temporary
Residents in Pine Knolls, Northside, CHAPEL HILL NEWS (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 9, 2011, at 1A.
193. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 45, at 2, 12 (discussing Annapolis conservation district
intended to prevent construction of waterfront condominiums); Joe Schwartz, A Delicate
Balance, INDEP. WEEKLY (Durham, N.C.), June 16, 2010, at 16, available at 2010 WLNR
13214345.
194. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 188.
195. See Schwartz, supra note 193 (“We’re not fighting the students [who make up the
majority of renters], what we’re fighting for is preservation of our neighborhood. . . . We’re
trying to keep that feel, and [tightening conservation-district regulations] is the only way we
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Minneapolis considered adoption of neighborhood conservation regulations when
“land occupied by older workers’ homes was recently rezoned to allow multi-story,
mixed-use residential buildings, potentially threatening these smaller dwellings.”196
McMansions are a newer form of a supposed nuisance.197 When property
theorists analyze the impact that a person’s use of land has on his or her neighbors,
they typically consider nuisances and noxious uses that impose identifiable
economic externalities.198 Manufacturing facilities that emit pollutants and attract
heavy trucks, office complexes that cause rush-hour traffic jams, and even
apartment buildings that unleash the horrors described in detail by Justice
Sutherland in Euclid are common examples.199 The assumption that rental
buildings, whether duplexes or high-rises, compromise the quality of life in singlefamily neighborhoods is not new. It has persisted for at least a century.200 In fact,
Fischel traces the history of zoning in the United States and concludes that local

know how.”); see also Latifi, supra note 32 (quoting an observer of a battle between a
developer and local residents as commenting that the developer may have “underestimated the
community’s psychological ownership” of an area).
196. MCCLURG, supra note 36, at 33.
197. The term McMansion typically refers to homes that are large by historic standards
and are located on suburban-sized lots, a half-acre or more, far from center cities. In the context
of neighborhood conservation districts, however, the term McMansion takes on a slightly
different meaning. Neighborhood conservation districts are not designed to address
homogenous subdivisions consisting of large homes on suburban lots, a phenomenon
commonly known as sprawl. Instead, they are designed to address teardowns and
“mansionization.”
“[M]ansionization is formally defined as ‘replacing (or constructing additions to) smaller
dwellings within established neighborhoods with significantly larger homes,’ and is
synonymous with residential infill development.” INSTITUTE FOR REGIONAL EXCELLENCE,
METRO. WASH. COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, WHAT TO DO ABOUT . . . MANSIONIZATION . . .
ENCOURAGE, PROHIBIT OR SIMPLY MANAGE? COMMUNITY IMPACTS & POLICY ALTERNATIVES
2 (2006), quoted in Paul J. Weinberg, Mansionization and Its Ordinances: How’s That
Working Out for You?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Feb. 2013, at 1, 2. Infill development is new
construction that typically increases density or changes existing land-use patterns after an area is
initially developed. Conservation districts provide a mechanism for residents to stymie their
neighbors’ efforts to maximize the square footage of existing homes. While regulations resisting
mansionization are new, complaints about mansionization are not. Henry James, for example,
famously decried the demolition of his childhood home just north of Washington Square to make
way for “marble mansions and baroque ornamentation.” PAGE, supra note 97, at 41.
198. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive
Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 222–23 (2012) (summarizing major contributions to
the development of property-law theory on negative externalities, illustrated by all of the described
theorists through examples of individual property owners polluting the natural environment).
199. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. In recent years, that assumption has faced
serious scrutiny by planners, particularly those who ascribe to the New Urbanism. The original
Awahnee Principles that are the foundation of the New Urbanist movement provide that “[a]
community should contain a diversity of housing types to enable citizens from a wide range of
economic levels and age groups to live within its boundaries.” LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, THE
AHWAHNEE PRINCIPLES FOR RESOURCE-EFFICIENT COMMUNITIES 2 (1991) (emphasis added).
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zoning has always been motivated by the desire to protect the value of singlefamily homes in residential areas.201
The pejorative term “McMansion” first appeared in common usage in the 1980s202
but its use “was limited prior to 2000.”203 The harms allegedly imposed by
McMansions are myriad. They include increased housing prices,204 suburban
sprawl,205 and—of particular note here—aesthetic affronts.206 Where a McMansion
replaces an older, smaller home, preservationists and neighbors take particular
umbrage because the new structure undermines expectations of nearby homeowners.
As early as 1999, one observer noted that “battles [against the construction of
McMansions] are ongoing across the country as stock market money pours into
trophy homes.”207 The proliferation of neighborhood conservation districts in the
1990s and the first few years of the twenty-first century coincided with rising
concerns in commentary and academia regarding McMansions.
As with rental housing, the evidence that conservation-district advocates are
motivated by distaste for McMansions is plentiful. In the case of McMansions,
advocates decry additions “that are not in harmony with the surrounding area”208 and
the razing of existing single-family homes to make way for larger homes. In Wellesley,
Massachusetts, advocates argued for adoption of a neighborhood conservation
ordinance by citing recent “out-of-scale” development.209 In Edina, Minnesota, the

201. Fischel, supra note 172.
202. Nate Berg, The Wildly Variable Definition of ‘McMansion,’ ATLANTIC CITYLAB (Apr.
20, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2012/04/does-word-mcmansion-actually
-mean-anything/1813/.
203. Miller, supra note 157, at 1095. Miller identifies four common definitions for the term
McMansion: “a large home, a home that is large compared to others, a home lacking
architecturally or in its design, and a symbol for other concepts such as sprawl and excessive
consumption.” Id. at 1099.
204. Catherine Durkin, Comment, The Exclusionary Effect of “Mansionization”: Area
Variances Undermine Efforts To Achieve Housing Affordability, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 439, 439–
41 (2006). While the resistance to McMansions might suggest that conservation districts are not
motivated by desires to preserve property values, the rhetoric is not quite so clear. Some
advocates of conservation districts argue, for example, that McMansions decrease the value of
existing homes by reducing that value to “lot value.” These advocates argue that prohibiting
McMansions will, as a result, preserve or increase home values. See, e.g., Frequently Asked
Questions, BELMONT ADDITION CONSERVATION DISTRICT, http://belmontconservation.com
/ordinance-and-forms/frequently-asked-questions/.
205. Tamara Mullen, Comment, The McMansion: Architecture’s Role in Facilitating
Urban Sprawl and Farmland Loss, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 255, 257–59 (2007).
206. LEIGH GALLAGHER, THE END OF THE SUBURBS: WHERE THE AMERICAN DREAM IS
MOVING 69 (2013) (quoting the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of McMansion, “a
large modern house that is considered ostentatious and lacking in architectural integrity”).
207. Dwight H. Merriam, The 1999 ZiPLeRs: The Fifth Annual Zoning and Planning Law
Report Land Use Decision Awards, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Feb. 2000, at 9, 15 (noting a
homeowners’ association’s attempt to block construction of a “15,000 square-foot cottage”).
208. Daniel Goldberg, Coker Hills District Wins OK—The Neighborhood Conservation Rules
Will Take Affect Jan. 1, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Oct. 9, 2007, at 1 (“Supporters [of adopting
a conservation district] have said that the new rules will guard against people subdividing larger
lots and constructing additions that are not in harmony with the surrounding area.”).
209. Lisa Keen, Voters Approve Districts To Help Limit McMansions, BOS. GLOBE, May
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Edina Massing Task Force recommended neighborhood conservation districts to
combat “massing,” a synonym for “mansionization.”210 In San Antonio, residents
considered adoption of a neighborhood conservation district to address the possibility
that “[s]ome guy decides to build a two-story brick McMansion with a silly two-story
arched entry right next to the two-car garage” in “a neighborhood of low-slung, wooden
bungalows with shady wrap-around porches and detached garages.”211
The desire to prevent mansionization and exclude rental housing is not just
evident in advocacy materials. It also manifests in conservation-district regulations.
Guidelines applicable to the Hillsboro-West End district in Nashville require new
buildings to be “compatible, by not contrasting greatly, with those of surrounding
historic buildings” with respect to height, scale, materials, texture, details, material
color, and roof shape.212 Notably, new construction must be compatible with
“historic buildings,” not with other new buildings, without regard to whether new
construction or historic buildings are prevalent on a given block or in a given
neighborhood. In addition, the regulations permit demolition only where a building
“has irretrievably lost its architectural and historical integrity,” the building does not
contribute to the local character, or the inability to demolish a building “will result
in an economic hardship on the applicant.”213 In the case of rental housing, while some
districts take care to ensure that design guidelines themselves do not impact use, others
expressly limit any increase in the amount of rental housing. For example, in
Nashville’s conservation districts, property owners cannot build accessory units on
single-family lots unless they record a restrictive covenant that requires the homeowner
to live in either the original single-family home or the accessory unit.214 For all eternity,
the property owner cannot simultaneously rent out both the original home and the
accessory unit; only one of the two units can be rented to another party. In Chapel Hill,
neighborhood conservation-district regulations limit bedroom-to-bathroom ratios on
the assumption that developers of rental housing and their tenants will want more
bathrooms per bedroom than owner-occupants would normally require. In addition,
two Chapel Hill neighborhood conservation districts prohibit homes occupied by
unrelated persons from having more than two bedrooms.215 Those same conservation
districts ban the construction of new duplexes, though, in 2011, town planners
“acknowledged creating the [conservation] district had failed to stop student-rental

6, 2007, at 3, available at 2007 WLNR 8775763.
210. Adam Johnson, Minnetonka Could Become First MN City To Implement So-Called
“McMansion Policy,” FIN. & COM. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Aug. 29, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 27176787.
211. Mike Greenberg, Design Rules Could Match Neighborhood, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 24, 2000, at 01B, available at 2000 WLNR 9685253.
212. METRO. HISTORIC ZONING COMM’N, METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CNTY.,
HILLSBORO-WEST END NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION ZONING 13–14 (rev. ed. 2012), available
at http://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/MHZC/docs/Preservation%20Permits/Maps
%20and%20Guidelines/HWE2012.pdf.
213. Id. at 21.
214. See NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CNTY., TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.16.030(F)(10)
(Supp. 2014).
215. Ray Gronberg, Bill Targets Neighborhood-Protection Zones, HERALD-SUN (Durham,
N.C.), Mar. 17, 2013, at A1, available at 2013 WLNR 6629454; Schwartz, supra note 188.
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conversions.”216 Whether a unit is occupied by its owner or is rented is not typically
in the province of zoning regulations, because it does not impact the use of the land.
But much of the rhetoric supporting conservation districts involves encouraging
home ownership, without regard to design or land use.217
Conservation-district regulations allow homeowners to resist market forces
towards higher density uses, whether those uses are multifamily rentals or large,
single-family homes. As a result, they artificially depress supply—a regulatory
impact that merits serious critical analysis, an analysis undertaken in Parts III and IV
of this Article.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH AESTHETICS: HAZARDS OF
SUBLOCAL CONTEXTUAL REGULATIONS
As described in Part II of this Article, the recent proliferation of conservation
districts is a response by homeowners to development pressures. Current residents
seek to freeze or depress housing supply, thus excluding potential future residents.
Advocates argue that neighborhood conservation districts advance cultural stability
and that requiring aesthetic regulations to be grounded in context creates an objective
standard by which to measure aesthetics. In fact, as this Part argues, grounding
aesthetic regulations in existing architectural context exacerbates, rather than
mitigates, certain exclusionary and inefficient impacts. 218 Addressing those negative
impacts—decreased affordability, increased exclusivity, and information
asymmetries—should inform any future legislative and regulatory land-use action
that incorporates aesthetics.
A. The Affordability Conundrum
The evolution of land uses, which—as described in Part II—occurred so visibly
in New York City,219 takes place in cities and suburbs everywhere. Cities are in a
moment of transition, in which older residential neighborhoods are increasingly

216. Ferral, supra note 192.
217. See Fischel, supra note 172, at 332.
218. Asking whether neighborhood conservation districts are efficient is really asking two
different questions. First, do these districts effectively and without unnecessarily wasting
resources meet their own stated goal—to protect and conserve existing neighborhoods?
Conservation districts vary in this regard, and it is difficult to generalize across districts.
Chapel Hill’s first neighborhood conservation district, for the Northside neighborhood, was
adopted in February 2004. See CHAPEL HILL TOWN COUNCIL, NORTHSIDE NEIGHBORHOOD
CONSERVATION DISTRICT PLAN (2004), available at http://www.townofchapelhill.org
/home/showdocument?id=12179. Six years later, however, the local planning board and
neighborhood residents presented a petition to the city council protesting that the conservation
district was ineffective at stemming development pressures in the neighborhood. TOWN OF
CHAPEL HILL, NORTHSIDE AND PINE KNOLLS COMMUNITY PLAN 7 (2012), available at
http://www.townofchapelhill.org/home/showdocument?id=11921.
Second, do these districts result in or exacerbate inefficiencies in the housing market?
Given conservation districts’ shared characteristics, as described in Part II, supra, it is possible
to draw some conclusions about this second question.
219. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
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desirable.220 The supply of old, walkable neighborhoods close to fixed amenities is
necessarily constrained. As a result, as urban residential neighborhoods become more
desirable, they also become more expensive.
Many advocates of conservation districts argue that designation of a conservation
district preserves affordability.221 They argue that designation prevents new
homeowners from tearing down smaller existing structures and replacing them with
larger, presumably more expensive, structures.222 And they argue that because
designation prevents properties from being used for denser purposes, it preserves
affordability.223 As the argument goes, a one-half acre lot with a single-family house
would be more valuable if it were redeveloped as a larger single-family house or if
it were redeveloped to accommodate additional units. A regulatory cap on the size
of the house or the number of units will prevent a property’s value from escalating
to reflect the denser potential use.
But there is more to the affordability story. The attempt to preserve affordability
by restricting denser uses ignores the impact that artificial restrictions on supply will
have on price.224 If demand for urban-neighborhood housing is increasing and there
is a limited supply of land that is proximate to central business districts and transit,
coupled with regulatory constraints on the ability to develop and redevelop that land,
prices will increase. Under those circumstances, a decrease in affordability is
inevitable.225 Neighborhood conservation districts suggest an intralocal version of a
national problem, a spatial mismatch between housing demand and supply. Scholars
and popular commentators have bemoaned the effect that restrictive land-use

220. See supra notes 175–80 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. A § 3.6.5 (including the
promotion and retention of affordable housing as one purpose for the creation of neighborhood
conservation districts), reprinted in Sample Conservation District Ordinance Provisions, 21
PRESERVATION L. REP. 1059, 1078 (2002–03); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT
CODE § 35-335 (Supp. 2014) (including promotion and retention of affordable housing as a
goal of neighborhood conservation districts); see also infra note 232.
222. See Malachi Reid Peacock, Neighborhood Conservation Districts and Their
Relevance to Historic Preservation in the 21st Century 12 (2009) (unpublished Master’s
thesis), available at https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/peacock_malachi_r_200908_mhp.pdf
(“Affordable housing and property values are protected by neighborhood conservation
districts because teardowns-to-McMansions are not permitted to gentrify neighborhoods and
negatively influence the property values of existing residents.”).
223. Cf. Schoendorf, supra note 184, at 57 (“Without any protective mechanism in place,
West Hillsborough may fall victim to large out of scale development . . . . [L]ow-income or
fixed-income residents will be priced out, and the neighborhood will start to gentrify . . . .
Consequently, Hillsborough’s supply of affordable housing will be reduced.”).
224. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on
Housing Affordability, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL. REV., June 2003, at 21 (“[H]ousing
is expensive because of artificial limits on construction created by the regulation of new
housing.”); see also MATTHEW YGLESIAS, THE RENT IS TOO DAMN HIGH (2012).
225. As discussed in note 257, infra, preservation of property values is an oft-cited
rationale for aesthetic land-use regulations. Given the impact that aesthetic regulations have
on restricting supply, aesthetic land-use regulations preserve property values in part simply
because they artificially restrict supply, thus inflating prices—not, as advocates often argue,
because the regulations themselves add value.
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regulations have on housing costs in high-demand regions of the country.226 The
perverse effect is that migration now flows to low-housing-cost, low-wage areas of
the country.227 This Article suggests, however, even within those low-housing-cost,
low-wage regions, restrictive land-use regulations prevent supply from meeting
demand in the most desirable locations.
In short, the places where neighborhood conservation districts are common are
the same places where increasing the density of housing stock is an appropriate
measure to meet housing demand in a sustainable manner. Freezing these
neighborhoods in time will not put an end to demand for housing. It will simply force
would-be residents to live elsewhere,228 perhaps somewhere further from public
transit and from employment opportunities, thus increasing commuting times along
with the well-documented environmental impacts of sprawl.229 This dislocation of
housing demand has significant deleterious effects on the economy.230 Those forced
to live far from transit and job opportunities suffer financial consequences and
decreased economic opportunity.231
In the absence of empirical research specifically demonstrating that conservation
districts contribute to the lack of affordable housing in urban and suburban areas,

226. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, & Raven E. Saks, Why Have Housing
Prices Gone Up? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11129, 2005); Matthew
Yglesias, Housing Affordability Is Blue America’s Greatest Failing, VOX (Dec. 15, 2014, 10:45
A.M.), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/28/6063679/the-biggest-thing-the-blue-states-are-screwing
-up; see also John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 93 n.10
(2014) (collecting sources).
227. Mangin, supra note 226, at 93.
228. GLAESER, supra note 98, at 147 (“Indeed, opposing new building is the surest way to
make a popular area unaffordable.”).
229. See generally Samuel Brody, The Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences of
Sprawling Development Patterns in the United States, 4 NATURE EDUC. KNOWLEDGE, no. 5,
2013, at 2, available at http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/the-characteristics
-causes-and-consequences-of-sprawling-103014747 (“[N]egative impacts include, among
others, air pollution resulting from automobile dependency, water pollution caused in part by
increases in impervious surfaces, the loss or disruption of environmentally sensitive areas . . .
reductions in open space, increased flood risks, and overall reductions in quality of life.”).
230. These effects occur on both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. See Schleicher,
supra note 11, at 1692–93 (collecting sources).
231. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Stranded by Sprawl, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2013, at
A17 (“[D]isadvantaged workers often find themselves stranded; there may be jobs available
somewhere, but they literally can’t get there.” (citing RAJ CHETTY, NATHANIEL HENDREN,
PATRICK KLEIN & EMMANUEL SAEZ, THE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY PROJECT (2013),
available at http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/website/IGE/Executive%20Summary.pdf)).
The use of design regulations to exclusionary effect is not limited to the housing sphere.
Beavercreek, Ohio, a suburb of Dayton, applied design criteria to refuse to install bus stops
necessary to the introduction of regional bus service, which would allow Dayton residents
access to a hospital, large shopping center, and employment in Beavercreek. Ultimately,
advocates succeeded in forcing Beavercreek to accept bus service only by invoking Title VI
of the Federal Civil Rights Act. See Anita Hairston, Transportation Equity: A Civil Rights
Issue, Remarks for the Leadership Conference Education Fund (July 1, 2014), transcript
available at http://equitycaucus.org/sites/default/files/Transript%20for%20TEC%20Jul%201
%202014%20Webinar_1.pdf.
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some might argue that it is premature to endeavor to solve this problem. But
advocates of conservation districts routinely argue that these districts increase
property values.232 And, arguing by analogy, research demonstrates the impact of
historic designation on housing prices.233 Increasing property values for current
residents necessarily increases housing prices, thus decreasing affordability for
renters and for future residents. Certainly the impact of conservation-district
adoption on housing prices is an area ripe for empirical analysis. But even in the
absence of such empirical analysis, planners, policymakers, and residents should
worry about housing-affordability issues.
Meeting demand for housing in cities and older suburbs and doing so in a way
that is affordable will require those locations to evolve and adapt to accommodate
different kinds of housing stock that respond to the desires of demographic
populations that once spent decades depopulating urban centers. Neighborhood
conservation districts commonly face strong development pressures. It should be no
surprise that developers are attracted to these neighborhoods, which are close to
universities, downtown areas, and other job centers. In addition, because these are
older neighborhoods close to downtown urban areas, they are walkable and well
served—relative to the broader regions in which they are located—by public transit.

232. Advocates often argue that adoption of a neighborhood conservation district will
increase property values. See, e.g., Sappenfield, supra note 186 (“[I]t makes sense to protect
your neighborhood character and, by doing so, protect your own property value.”); Michael
Benhaim, Conservation District Not Right for Settlement Neighborhood, WICKED LOCAL
(Nov. 10, 2012, 10:14 A.M.), http://www.wickedlocal.com/brookline/news/x481717181
/Column-Conservation-district-not-right-for-Settlement-neighborhood?zc_p=1 (“I have heard
claims that this NCD will increase our property value, but have not seen any type of study or
actual evidence of that.”); Frequently Asked Questions, KESSLER NEIGHBORS UNITED,
http://kesslerpark.org/about/conservationdistrict/cdfaq/ (“We believe that becoming a
conservation district can protect and possibly increase property values.”); Laura Ward, The
Lower Jefferson Conservation District, UNIV. MO., http://web.missouri.edu/~wardla
/lowerjeffersonconservationdistrict.html (last revised Aug. 9, 2009) (“A neighborhood
conservation district helps a neighborhood . . . stabilize and improve property values . . . .”).
The inherent contradiction apparent in much of conservation district advocacy—that
conservation districts will simultaneously increase property values and increase
affordability—is discussed in Part IV.A.3, infra.
233. See, e.g., N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF HISTORIC DISTRICTS ON
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES 8 (2003), available at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports
/HistoricDistricts03.pdf (“IBO found clear evidence that after controlling for property and
neighborhood characteristics, market values of properties in historic districts were higher than
those outside historic districts for every year in our study.”); Robin M. Leichenko, N. Edward
Coulson & David Listokin, Historic Preservation and Residential Property Values: An Analysis
of Texas Cities, 38 URB. STUD. 1973, 1973 (2001) (“Results suggest that, in most cases, historic
designation is associated with higher property values.”); Dan S. Rickman, Neighborhood
Historic Preservation Status and Housing Values in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, 39 J.
REGIONAL ANALYSIS & POL’Y 99, 99 (2009), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu
/bitstream/132429/2/09-2-1.pdf (“Neighborhood historic designation is found to be associated
with significant relative appreciation of housing values in most districts.”); M. Keivan Deravi,
Property Value Appreciation for Historic Districts in Alabama 1–7 (July 31, 2002) (unpublished
report submitted to the Alabama Historical Commission summarizing literature assessing the
impact of historical districts on property values).
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Protecting those characteristics by limiting supply of a product in high demand
diminishes, rather than promotes, affordability.234
B. The First-Equity Problem: Who Is the Community?
Sublocal governance structures prioritize the voice of those who live within or, in
those cases where sublocal voice is limited to property owners, own property within the
demarcated boundaries of the district. Other interests are diminished. As a result, any
effects or impacts felt by renters, future housing consumers, and those who reside outside
of the proposed district are ignored or discounted in the decision-making process.
1. Excluding Nonresidents
Sublocal administration allows those whose property values will be affected by
the design guidelines to determine how vigilantly to apply them. At least one
proponent of sublocal land-use control, building off of Fischel’s work, argues that
those most affected by their neighbors’ land-use decisions will most efficiently
exercise the power to control land use and, therefore, that zoning authority is properly
exercised at the sublocal level, particularly in large cities.235 Another purported
benefit of sublocal administration is that a sublocal commission endowed with the
authority to enforce a zoning ordinance can choose to enforce some measures
vigorously while softening the impact of design guidelines considered harsh or
costly.236 When second-party enforcement takes place, it is nuanced in a way that is

234. The lack of affordable housing in urban and suburban areas and the negative impacts
resulting from that lack of housing are well-documented. See, e.g., Gabriella Chiarenza, Fed.
Reserve Bank of S.F., Challenges for Affordable Housing in a New Era of Scarcity,
COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS, Spring 2013, at 3, 3–4 (collecting statistics demonstrating the
current lack of affordable housing and projections of increased demand pressure in the future);
Lance Freeman, America’s Affordable Housing Crisis: A Contract Unfulfilled, 92 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 709, 709 (2002) (“[I]n many expensive urban centers even used housing is beyond
the means of many low-income households.”).
235. Stahl, supra note 122, at 948–50 (advocating sublocal zoning but ignoring the history
of neighborhood conservation districts); see also Stephen R. Miller, Legal Neighborhoods, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 149–52 (2013) (describing favorably rezoning processes that
incorporate neighborhood-level input but omitting from discussion any reference to
neighborhood conservation districts).
236. Tad Heuer, in an article on a historic district in New Haven, Connecticut, describes
“second-party enforcement, defined for these purposes as the enforcement of communal
standards by other members of the community, relying on the community’s own internal social
norms rather than on external ‘third-party’ enforcement by official governmental entities.”
Tad Heuer, Living History: How Homeowners in a New Local Historic District Negotiate
Their Legal Obligations, 116 YALE L.J. 768, 802 (2007). “First-party enforcement” is
self-enforcement, where property owners simply obey the strictures of the historic-district
regulations. With respect to second-party enforcement, Heuer found that “all violations [are]
not deemed to be equal.” Id. at 803. In the words of one property owner, “I like the idea of the
historic district a lot, but I do think that they need to be a bit more flexible on things like
windows, particularly for some of the elderly on fixed incomes. Oil is becoming so expensive,
and people really need to be able to save money on their fuel costs, and making sure you have
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not necessarily consistent with the strictures of design-review requirements.237
Extrapolating this research to the neighborhood conservation-district realm, one
would expect both negative and positive effects. Sublocal administration might result
in more nuanced decision making that incorporates neighborhood-level
understandings of the cost of compliance and individual homeowners’ relevant
circumstances.238 In addition, however, it might result in unpredictable decision
making that incorporates neighborhood politics and relationships.
Advocates of sublocal control ignore spillover effects that impact areas outside of
the relevant sublocality. Where there are spillover effects or externalities affecting
areas outside of the district, sublocal designation and administration excludes a
subset of affected persons from the decision-making process. Tiebout’s model of
efficient provision of local services assumes that there are no externalities imposed
by local decisions.239 This assumption, as Tiebout himself acknowledged, is just
that—an assumption—and will prove incorrect under most real-world
circumstances.240 The decision to adopt a neighborhood conservation district will
have impacts on other parts of a municipality. Following adoption of a neighborhood
conservation district intended to resist development pressures, other nearby

insulated windows is a big part of that.” Id. at 804.
237. Id.; cf. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28–33, 47 (2010) (arguing that substate and sublocal
institutions can serve as vehicles for minority rule and promote democratic values by initiating
dialogue with other institutions).
238. Alternatively, a neighborhood may choose to adopt a neighborhood conservation
district because it prefers public-local—rather than private-sublocal—administration of design
guidelines. In Coker Hills, a neighborhood in Chapel Hill, the local homeowners’ association
successfully advocated for adoption of a neighborhood conservation district to replicate the
association’s own design guidelines, embodied in a restrictive covenant. See TOWN OF CHAPEL
HILL, COMPARISON OF NEIGHBORHOOD COVENANT RESTRICTIONS AND CURRENT ZONING
REGULATIONS (2006). The homeowners’ association had tired of the time, expense, and
neighborhood discord borne of privately enforcing the restrictive covenant. The neighborhood
conservation district provided a mechanism for imposing that cost and bad will on the
municipality. Conservation-district advocates told the town council that they “merely want the
covenant to be reflected in town law. This would shift enforcement responsibility to the town
from the neighborhood association, whose only recourse is to sue an offending property
owner.” Matt Dees, Zoning Rancor Saddens Council, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
May 16, 2006, at B1. Houston, Texas, will enforce violations of restrictive covenants. This
use of public resources and authority to enforce private property interests and contracts
replicates a kind of zoning authority despite the oft-cited claim that there is no zoning in
Houston. Teddy M. Kapur, Land Use Regulation in Houston Contradicts the City’s Free
Market Reputation, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10045, 10050 (2004). It is far from clear why a
municipality would willingly take on an assignment of responsibility to incur costs and bad
will to enforce private contracts. This fact suggests that there is a vocal-minority,
silent-majority problem here.
239. Because the model assumes that there are no externalities, the sorts of regional
problems that would be best addressed at the national, state, or regional level are unaccounted
for in the basic Tiebout model. Tiebout, supra note 123, at 419; see also Bratton & McCahery,
supra note 126, at 231 (“The Tiebout model unrealistically assumes the absence of
externalities.”).
240. Tiebout, supra note 123, at 423.
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neighborhoods may feel those pressures more strongly. If a developer can no longer
build duplexes in North Neighborhood, he or she may seek out development
opportunities in South Neighborhood. Briffault recognizes this issue and argues that
it can be addressed so long as sublocal institutions “lack true autonomy” and cannot
act without local approvals.241
Typically, sublocal approval is necessary but not sufficient for adoption of a
neighborhood conservation district. In most municipalities, neighborhood
conservation districts require a sublocal referendum, petition, or other expression of
sublocal support but then are formally adopted at the local level.242 The two-step
approval mechanism requires the consent of both the local government, whether it
acts through a town council or a planning commission, and a majority or
supermajority of property owners or residents in the affected district.
If adoption of a neighborhood conservation district will impose negative
externalities on other neighborhoods, the requirement that the locality also approve
the district can limit those externalities. If a neighborhood conservation district takes
on a problem that is better served at the local level, the local government can refuse
to adopt or revise the terms of the neighborhood conservation district. The residents
of South Neighborhood have no voice in the North Neighborhood referendum, but
they can exercise their political voice against approval of the district at the local level.
The local government represents all of the residents in the municipality, not just
the property owners in the proposed district. It must respond to a much broader array
of interests than may be present in the limited area that makes up the proposed
neighborhood conservation district. It also has the ability to set priorities, plan for
accomplishment of those priorities, and fund its activities on a local, rather than
sublocal, scale. Where a locality includes numerous neighborhoods with varying
income levels, preferences, and infrastructure needs, citywide planning can result in
a more efficient result. In a different context, Vicki Been has noted that “[a]
jurisdiction-wide approach to the local government’s needs is likely to be more
comprehensive, better planned, and better integrated with the local government’s
other initiatives.”243
As a result, the requirement that local adoption follow sublocal approval could, in
theory, protect against the hazards that may be otherwise associated with sublocal
governance. In practice, however, a review of neighborhood conservation districts

241. Briffault, supra note 124, at 528.
242. This bifurcation of the adoption process may be in response to case law that suggests
that pure assignment of zoning authority to a sublocal district would be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Eubank v. City
of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); see also Stahl, supra note 122, at 957–62 (discussing the
cases); Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 164–77 (1977–
78) (reconciling the cases). The bifurcated process is also consistent with Briffault’s
description of sublocal institutions’ operations. See generally Briffault, supra note 124.
243. Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 26 (2010) (comparing
neighborhood-level planning to local planning in the context of neighborhood-level
negotiation of community-benefits agreements).
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nationwide has not revealed any instances of local denial following sublocal
approval.244 Because conservation-district regulations are perceived as burdens only
on local property owners and because local property owners are often heavily
invested in their neighborhood’s character, local governments defer to the sublocal
choice whether to adopt a neighborhood conservation district. In addition, advocates
of neighborhood conservation districts are, as others have argued with respect to
homeowners generally, a deeply vested interest group for whom political
mobilization is facilitated by their geographic proximity to one another.245 The
residents outside the neighborhood conservation district who may suffer negative
externalities are dispersed and more difficult to mobilize. They may not be aware of
the negative impact that the district will have on them until after the district is adopted
and those impacts are felt. As a result, the local check on sublocal governance is
insufficient to protect those living outside of the district from the negative
externalities resulting from creation of the neighborhood conservation district.
2. Excluding Renters
In addition to excluding nonresidents, conservation-district governance often also
excludes renters.246 In these districts, only property owners vote in the referenda
necessary to adopt a neighborhood conservation district.247 And only property
owners are guaranteed seats on design-review boards.248
While developers might represent the interests of renters, sublocal governance, in
effect, diminishes their voice. In large cities, the voice of each individual citizen is
muted by the difficulties of deliberation and decision making by a large number of
parties, spread out over a large area. When governance occurs at the county or state
level or, in the case of large municipalities, at the local level, moneyed interests—
including real-estate developers—play an outsized role. They are able to gather
information, develop a coherent policy position, nurture relationships with decision

244. See, e.g., HENGEN & BALDWIN, supra note 116.
245. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 11, at 1731.
246. While renters may not be represented during the sublocal approval process, they will
be represented when citywide approval is considered. If, in practice, the local government
simply defers to the sublocal decision to adopt a conservation district, then either (1) there is
no local interest that is negatively affected by adoption of the district or (2) the local adoption
process fails to account for negative impacts on the local community. The latter explanation
is consistent with the homevoter hypothesis and newspaper accounts of conservation-district
adoption. In addition, notably, where design-review commission members must be property
owners—even if renters participate in the decision to adopt a conservation district—renters
will be excluded from administration of that district.
247. See, e.g., CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. A § 3.6.5(c)(2)(A) (Supp.
2014) (empowering owners representing fifty-one percent of the land area within a district, or
fifty-one percent of property owners, to initiate the process for a neighborhood conservation
district by referenda).
248. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.78.160(A) (Supp. 2012)
(guaranteeing seats on neighborhood conservation district commissions to at least two
homeowners and limiting representation of those who do not live within the district). The
Cambridge ordinance also prioritizes homeowners over other property owners, such as
landlords or owners of commercial properties.
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makers, and exercise influence that exceeds their vote count in a direct democracy.
This is borne out in the literature on the influence exerted by real-estate developers
at different levels of government: “Because of their larger size, which makes it more
difficult for voters to know candidates’ positions, county governments were more
often responsive to developer interests and thus were regarded as excessively
permissive by owners of homes in existing neighbourhoods.”249 In contrast, “[t]he
small size of local units makes it easier for citizens to voice their views to their local
government and their fellow local citizens, to respond to each other’s concerns, and
to deliberate concerning important local public matters.”250 As a result, sublocal
adoption and administration of neighborhood conservation districts, particularly in
areas dominated by homeowners, amplifies homeowner voice relative to developers.
In limiting participation to property owners, neighborhood conservation districts
are similar to another sublocal institution, the business improvement district.251
Business improvement districts, commonly known as BIDs, limit participation to
property owners because they impose costs on property owners, assessments that are
used to provide public goods and services—everything from street cleaning to
marketing and advertising a downtown commercial district. “Because BIDs are
financed by taxes on property or businesses within the districts, most state laws
condition the formation of a district on some proof that the property or business
owners endorse the supplemental taxation.”252 While, as their name suggests, BIDs
are commonly found in commercial districts, one influential scholar has advocated
the adoption of an analogous institution, the Block Improvement District (BLID), in
residential neighborhoods.253 Arguing that small, block-level institutions will
provide a rich opportunity for homeowners to engage in self-governance and to
express their preferences for public goods, Robert Ellickson argues that BLIDs could
replicate in urban neighborhoods the residential community associations that are
common in suburban subdivisions.254 His framework for BLIDs requires that
governance be limited to property owners because the value of sublocal public goods
is capitalized into the price of their homes.255 Ellickson argues that because property
owners incur the costs of providing public goods and also benefit from the increase
in their property values resulting from those public goods, they are in the best
position to make decisions regarding public goods.256 Conservation districts, unlike
BIDs or BLIDs, are regulatory structures, not taxing districts that burden only

249. Fischel, supra note 172, at 326.
250. Briffault, supra note 124, at 505.
251. See id. at 519–20.
252. Id. at 519.
253. Ellickson, supra note 169, at 77.
254. Id. at 81–82.
255. Id. at 92–93.
256. To the extent that costs are passed on to tenants in the form of increased rents, tenants
may, in effect, incur these costs. They will not see a benefit in the form of enhanced property
values. Whether any one tenant enjoys any benefits will depend on the nature of the service
provided (does the tenant appreciate the increased service provision?) and his or her ability to
relocate if he or she does not value the increased service provision in an amount equal to or
greater than the increase in rent, thus allowing a renter who does value the increased service
provision to occupy the unit.
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property owners. Nevertheless, some conservation districts have imported BID rules
that limit voting rights to property owners.257
Limiting “the community” to property owners in the proposed district comports
with a property-value preservation approach to land-use planning.258 But it is not
consistent with the goal of advancing community-based decision making.
Community preservation is not a value or interest unique to property owners. If
hyperlocal voting on neighborhood conservation districts excludes renters, these
referenda inefficiently gauge local support for these restrictions—and the utility to
be gained or lost from their adoption—by omitting a group directly and indirectly
affected by the decision to adopt aesthetic regulations. 259 And if aesthetic land-use
regulations will increase rents by raising the cost of property maintenance or by
raising property values, renters will have another reason to voice their opinion on
adoption of neighborhood conservation districts. Then, even if the sole rationale for
aesthetic land-use regulations is property-value preservation, it is inequitable and
inefficient260 to ignore the preferences of the renter population when deciding
whether to adopt such regulations.
3. Excluding Future Housing Consumers
Always omitted from the concept of “the community” in these discussions are those
who would like to live in a neighborhood but who do not yet live there, or “future
housing consumers.”261 Zoning decisions—indeed, most policy making—often
excludes the voices of future interests from consideration. But neighborhood
conservation districts go a step further. By prioritizing consistency over all other policy
goals, conservation districts not only exclude the voices of future housing consumers,
they absolutely prohibit consideration of what future housing consumers’ preferences
might be.
Choices made today will affect development patterns and inform infrastructure
investments that are not easily undone. Land-use planning requires investing in

257. See infra Part IV.B.1.
258. That deploying land-use powers to increase property values, rather than to decrease
rents, is a proper use of the police powers is widely accepted, though debatable. It is also a
topic beyond the scope of this Article.
259. See infra Part IV.B.1.
260. The inefficiency results from a regulatory environment that prioritizes ever-escalating
prices rather than providing an array of price points that represents the preferences of the full
range of potential buyers. Because the supply of land is constrained and because housing, as a
result of zoning and building codes, is a highly regulated market, there are many fewer
entry-level units than there are potential entry-level buyers and renters.
261. Dallas restricts conservation districts to neighborhoods that are “stable.” According
to the Dallas code, “STABLE means that the area is expected to remain substantially the same
over the next 20 years with continued maintenance of the property. While some changes in
structures, land uses, and densities may occur, all such changes are expected to be compatible
with surrounding development.” DALL., TEX., CITY CODE § 51A-4.505(a)(8) (Supp. 2014). In
this way, Dallas attempts to accommodate future housing consumers by limiting conservation
districts to neighborhoods that are not experiencing significant change. The development
pressures that provoke neighborhood activists to adopt conservation districts, however,
suggest that the term “stable” is applied liberally.
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long-term decisions. If an environmentally sensitive wetland is filled and then
developed—whatever the impacts of that development may be in future years—it is
nearly impossible to undo the land-use permissions that allowed that development to
occur in the first instance. Similarly, if an area proximate to a transit station is
developed with single-family homes on large lots, despite the fact that more people
will have better access to transit if the area around the station is densely developed,
infill development is difficult. Land-purchase coordination problems, limitations on
existing infrastructure, and residents’ settled expectations complicate efforts to
densify an existing developed neighborhood. Land-use planning decisions are most
efficient if they consider future needs. In the case of neighborhood conservation
districts, the relevant future needs are the desires of those who would live in an area
but do not yet live there, either because the current housing stock does not
accommodate them or because they do not yet exist.
Future housing consumers are not easily identified. They do not vote in sublocal
referenda, though, in the case of would-be residents, they may vote in local or
statewide elections. A childless couple living in a downtown apartment may not be
aware of their own interests (five years down the road) in affordable home-ownership
opportunities in a residential neighborhood close to downtown. Future empty nesters
may not be cognizant of their interest in the development of smaller homes in dense,
walkable neighborhoods close to the suburban neighborhood where they raised their
children. At the time a neighborhood conservation district is adopted, there are many
who may be affected by the adoption of the district but who are unaware of the impact
that that decision has on them.
Despite these impediments, divining future housing consumers’ preferences is not
impossible. Planners are trained to consider and incorporate estimates of future
demand in crafting land-use regulations.262 The needs of future housing consumers
are expressed in the form of market demand, and real-estate developers act based on
their perception of market demand. The developer, motivated by potential profits,
may, in effect, give voice to would-be residents barred from the neighborhood by
exclusionary zoning policies. If the developer, because he or she does not already
own property in the neighborhood or is a minority stakeholder, is excluded from the
decision whether to adopt a conservation district, the voices of future housing
consumers are excluded. While developers may be excluded from sublocal decision
making, they are not excluded from local- and state-level decision making,263 though

262. Typical required courses in graduate urban-planning programs include economic
analysis and dynamic modeling.
263. Developers, acting in their own financial interest, can counteract sublocal land-use
planning efforts by advocating for state and local restrictions on the exercise of sublocal
authority. A hazard of overreaching aesthetic regulations is that those with an economic
interest in unfettered development will react to the overreach by advocating for repeal of those
aesthetic regulations and, perhaps, repeal of similar land-use regulations that are not
overreaching. During the 2013 legislative session, North Carolina state legislators introduced
two bills that would have invalidated the neighborhood conservation districts established in
Chapel Hill and elsewhere in North Carolina. H.R. 150, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013); S.
139, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013). Both bills would have required one hundred percent of
affected property owners to consent to the regulation of “building design elements” in one- and
two-family homes unless the affected structures or lots were located in local historic districts.
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their political clout, particularly at the local level, may be outmuscled by that of
homeowners.264
C. The Second-Equity Problem: Buyers Beware
Neighborhood conservation districts and related forms of design review
restrictions pose consumer-protection problems. Hannah Wiseman notes that design
overlay communities, which include neighborhood conservation districts,
offer none of the three notice protections—whether those protections are
real or merely theoretical—associated with private communities. There
is no formal recording requirement for the rules contained within the
overlay zone. Nor must the seller provide formal disclosure of the rules
to the buyer at or before closing. Even those who actively attempt to learn
of community rules before purchasing a home in overlay communities
will have trouble identifying them. A quick visit to the city code will not
reveal the neighborhood-specific zoning overlay absent vigilant
research.265
As a result, a homebuyer’s decision to purchase in a particular neighborhood may
be uninformed, and her valuation of her new asset may not account for the restricted
ability to use that asset. In his survey of homeowners in a design-review burdened
local historic district266 in New Haven, Tad Heuer found that about one-half of
homeowners who had purchased their homes after the historic district was adopted
did not know that their property was located in a local historic district.267 Hannah
Wiseman proposes that “incoming residents . . . should be formally alerted to the

The bills defined “building design elements” broadly to include “exterior building color; type
of style of exterior cladding material; style or materials or roof structures or porches; exterior
nonstructural architectural ornamentation; location or architectural styling of windows and
doors, including garage doors; the number and types of rooms; and the interior layout of
rooms.” N.C. H.R. 150 § 1; N.C. S. 139 § 1. The North Carolina Home Builders Association,
an affiliate of the National Association of Home Builders, lobbied legislators to support the
bill. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the bill garnered bipartisan support. On March 20, 2013,
the bill passed overwhelmingly in the house of representatives, but it later died in the senate. See
House Bill 150 (= S139), N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp
/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=H150 (showing last action on bill as rereferral to
committee). Chapel Hill Mayor Mark Kleinschmidt remarked to a Durham newspaper that the
issue did not break down on party lines but, instead, on geographic lines. Gronberg, supra note
215. Urban legislators rallied around neighborhood conservation districts, while suburban and
rural legislators voted for their demise, supporting the claim made above that neighborhood
conservation districts are creatures of cities and older suburbs—areas developed prior to the
proliferation of deed-restricted subdivisions and homeowners’ associations. See id.
264. See Been et al., supra note 161.
265. Wiseman, supra note 10, at 749 (footnote omitted).
266. For discussion of the differences between historic districts and conservation districts,
see supra text accompanying notes 47–59.
267. Heuer, supra note 236, at 790.
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existence of overlay rules in closing paperwork” in order to address this information
failure.268
A mandate that closing paperwork disclose overlay requirements addresses the
information failure in theory but may not have any real impact on a homeowner’s
actual knowledge. In part due to consumer-protection legislation in the home-finance
arena, at residential real-estate closings homebuyers are inundated with information
and disclosures, mostly relating to financing269 and, where applicable, to
common-interest ownership communities.270 Homebuyers routinely sign and initial
reams of documents without much understanding of what information is contained
in those documents. It is unlikely that a homeowner will take much notice of yet
another written disclosure at the closing table. In addition, closing may simply be too
late. At that time, the homebuyer has incurred attorney’s fees, loan-application fees,
and appraisal fees and, moreover, is contractually obligated to purchase the property.
In order to be effective, the disclosure must come earlier in the process, at the time
the homebuyer is deciding whether to make an offer on a property. Ideally, the
information would be disclosed in the real-estate listing itself.271 Requiring sellers to
disclose conservation district restrictions will also force homeowners to internalize the
costs associated with the restricted ability to subdivide, expand, or renovate property
even if the current homeowners do not desire to make those changes to their homes.
Even where a homeowner is aware that design controls exist, he or she may not
understand what is permitted by those design controls. First, he or she simply may
underestimate the extent of local control. Homebuyers in conservation districts are
susceptible to the same problem of incomplete information. CC&Rs are often more
restrictive than homebuyers had anticipated: “[O]nce residents have joined an
association, they are often surprised at the extent of collective control.”272 In addition
to being more restrictive than many homeowners might reasonably expect,
design-review regulations are often vague. They affect the use and value of property
but are not precise in how they limit changes and additions. Often, they list
considerations and factors without providing guidance as to how those factors will
be applied. For example, the guidelines applicable to the Mid Cambridge
Neighborhood Conservation Districts are not guidelines at all but, instead, simply a
list of questions to be asked of applicants.273 The questions include, “What are the

268. Wiseman, supra note 10, at 760.
269. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act imposes various disclosure requirements
in connection with residential home mortgages. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2012).
270. Connecticut’s Common Interest Ownership Act imposes disclosure requirements in
connection with the sale of residential condominium and cooperative units. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-262 to -281 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014).
271. There is some precedent for this requirement. For example, in Connecticut, whether
a residential property is located in a village or historic district must be disclosed in the
residential-condition report, a document that must, by statute, be provided by the seller to the
buyer before the buyer executes either a contract to purchase or a lease with an option to
purchase. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-327b(d)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2014).
272. NELSON, supra note 169, at 4.
273. Memorandum from the Mid Cambridge Neighborhood Conservation Dist. Comm’n
to Applicants to the Mid Cambridge Neighborhood Conservation Dist. Comm’n (Feb. 2,
1988), available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/MCNCD_guidelines.pdf.
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architectural features of the buildings in the neighborhood? What are the
architectural features of the proposed development (including materials, design, and
setting)?” The implication is that the architectural features should be consistent with
those in the neighborhood, but by what measure? Should they be identical, or is it
sufficient for the new construction to incorporate some architectural elements while
disregarding others? Are there certain architectural elements that are necessary,
while others are optional?
Even where guidelines purport to do more than simply list factors, the so-called
regulations are imprecise. Inherently vague terms abound in neighborhood
conservation-district regulations. These include words such as “considered,”
“compatible,” “minimized,” and “encouraged.”274 The vagueness of these
regulations, even if it does not rise to the level of a due process violation,275 is a

274. See, e.g., NAPA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.52.050(D) (Supp. 2015) (“No certificate
of appropriateness shall be issued unless the following findings are made: . . . The project shall
be compatible with those neighborhood characteristics that result from common ways of
building.” (emphasis added)); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.78.220(A)
(Supp. 2012) (“In passing upon matters before it, the Historical Commission or neighborhood
conservation district commission shall consider, among other things, the historic and
architectural value and significance of the site or structure, the general design, arrangement,
texture and material of the features involved, and the relation of such features to similar
features of structures in the surrounding area. In the case of new construction or additions to
existing structures a commission shall consider the appropriateness of the size and shape of
the structure both in relation to the land area upon which the structure is situated and to
structures in the vicinity, and a Commission may in appropriate cases impose dimensional and
setback requirements in addition to those required by applicable provision of the zoning
ordinance.” (emphases added)); CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 3.6.5 (Supp.
2014) (“The purposes of a neighborhood conservation district in older town residential
neighborhoods or commercial districts are as follows: . . . To encourage and strengthen civic
pride; and [t]o encourage the harmonious, orderly and efficient growth and redevelopment of the
Town.” (emphases added)); Cambridge, Mass., Avon Hill Neighborhood Conservation Dist.
Designation Order § V(C)(1) (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov
/historic/AHNCD_order.pdf (amended order) (“Impacts on significant landscape features and
mature plantings should be minimized.”).
275. Others have considered the question of whether design guidelines violate the Fifth
Amendment because they are overly vague. Most courts to consider the question have
concluded that design guidelines are not unconstitutionally vague. Compare Morristown Rd.
Assocs. v. Mayor of the Borough of Bernardsville, 394 A.2d 157, 163 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978)
(holding design-review standards unconstitutionally vague), and Anderson v. City of
Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 752 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (striking down a municipality’s design
requirements as unconstitutionally vague), with Novi v. City of Pacifica, 215 Cal. Rptr. 439,
441 (Ct. App. 1985) (“California courts permit vague standards because they are sensitive to
the need of government in large urban areas to delegate broad discretionary power to
administrative bodies . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), State ex rel. Stoyanoff v.
Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 312 (Mo. 1970), Nadelson v. Twp. of Millburn, 688 A.2d 672,
677–78 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996) (upholding design-review standards within a historic district),
A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 452 (N.C. 1979), Vill. of Hudson v.
Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ohio 1984), Pinecrest Homeowners Ass’n v. Glen A.
Cloninger & Assocs., 87 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (distinguishing Anderson v.
City of Issaquah while upholding design-review standards), and State ex rel. Saveland Park
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burden on homeowners and developers and results in information asymmetries in the
housing market.276 As a pair of homeowners stated at a public hearing during which
they sought approvals to enlarge a home they had recently purchased in one of
Nashville’s neighborhood conservation districts, “I think we [bought the house]
without fully understanding what ‘historical’ meant.”277 The pair is a young couple
expecting a child. They had purchased this home with the expectation that they would
be able to renovate it to meet their desires and needs for their family. Whatever the
merits of their proposed architectural design might be, it is clear that their
expectations were undermined by the neighborhood conservation-district guidelines.
If so, they may have overpaid for their house and for associated costs, such as legal
fees and architectural-design fees. The result, attributable to a lack of information, is
an inefficient market for housing, where homes restricted by aesthetic controls may
be overvalued, while those that are unrestricted may be undervalued. Again, the
result is a decrease in housing affordability, this time arising from inefficiencies and
transaction costs imposed by vague regulations in the housing market.
The vagueness inherent in conservation-district guidelines is evidence of two key
problems for policymakers and scholars. First, the proverbial truth that beauty is in
the eye of the beholder makes aesthetic rulemaking difficult. It is nearly impossible
to regulate aesthetics with the degree of certainty that informed property buyers, good
public policy, and properly functioning markets require. Second, the degree of
vagueness misleads voters. If these guidelines were truly honest, they would look
more like the M Streets East guidelines in Dallas.278 The desire to avoid codifying
the level of detail in the M Streets East guidelines is an indication that many are
uncomfortable with purely aesthetic regulations. Codifying that level of detail would
crystallize the degree to which these guidelines inhibit individual choice. That level of
crystallization might give rise to greater skepticism among homebuyers and voters and
a greater degree of scrutiny from courts. By leaving things vague, design-review boards
and city-planning staff reserve for themselves the discretion to restrict truly aesthetic
choices while maintaining the appearance that they will exercise their discretion only
to further goals that are not aesthetic or that coexist with aesthetic goals.
IV. PRESERVING CHANGE: CHALLENGING THE COMMUNITY-STABILITY MODEL
This Article does not attempt to dethrone aesthetics as a proper consideration in
exercising the police power. Even the most basic Euclidean ordinance serves
aesthetic objectives. It is an impossible task to disaggregate aesthetic regulations
from those that serve other legitimate police-power purposes. Instead, the more
effective approach is to permit aesthetic regulations while limiting the adverse effects
of those regulations. In the case of conservation districts, state legislators can cabin

Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Wis. 1955).
276. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 584
(2013) (giving examples of aesthetic, form-based codes that may be constitutional yet may
present practical difficulties for property owners).
277. MetroGovNashville, 06/19/13 Historic Zoning Commission Meeting, YOUTUBE (June
20, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cPR_HAatU0 (testimony at 00:31:41).
278. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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those negative impacts by, first, requiring regulations to anticipate change and,
second, embracing inclusivity when adopting and drafting regulations.
This Part proposes two major shifts in thinking about neighborhood conservation
and cultural stability. First, lawmakers, regulators, and scholars should dissociate
aesthetics from consistency. In particular, state zoning-enabling legislation should
acknowledge the role that change plays in neighborhood culture by requiring
aesthetic regulations to anticipate and accommodate housing demand, changing
markets, and demographics. In this way, state enabling legislation can force residents
and planners to imagine and develop land-use regulations that conserve cherished
neighborhood features while also allowing for the possibility of more dense
development in appropriate locations. For too long, neighborhood activists have
assumed that increased density will tear apart neighborhood fabrics; they have thus
refused to innovate regulations that preserve neighborhood fabric while also
accommodating increased density. Imposing state-level limitations on local adoption
of conservation districts will force that innovation to take place.
Second, state zoning-enabling legislation should require that those affected by
spillovers are included in both the decision to adopt conservation-district regulations
and the process of drafting those regulations. In essence, state zoning-enabling
legislation should disrupt the inertia resulting from homevoter279 control of local
land-use regulation. State and local lawmakers, planners, and courts all have roles to
play in requiring that conservation districts are dynamic and inclusive. But just as
externalities resulting from state-level lawmaking are properly addressed at the
federal level, in the case of conservation districts, spillovers and exclusionary effects
are properly addressed at the state level. State governments have an incentive to
curtail restrictive land-use policies that raise housing prices, because a lack of
affordable housing stymies economic development. Employers seek to locate where
their employees will enjoy a low cost of living.280 States, then, have an incentive to
prevent local land-use policies from raising housing prices.
In most of the states discussed in this Article, there is no express state legislation
authorizing localities to designate and regulate conservation districts. Instead, the
authority to adopt conservation-district regulations derives from a locality’s
home-rule powers or from state statutes that authorize local zoning or historic
preservation more generally.281 State lawmakers should cabin conservation districts

279. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
280. KEITH WARDRIP, LAURA WILLIAMS & SUZANNE HAGUE, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, THE
ROLE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN CREATING JOBS AND STIMULATING LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 10–13 (2011), available at http://www.nhc.org/media/files/Housing-and
-Economic-Development-Report-2011.pdf (summarizing surveys showing that the
availability and cost of housing are important considerations for employers deciding where to
locate their businesses).
281. Of the states featured in this Article (California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas), only Connecticut has a state authorizing
statute that expressly authorizes adoption of conservation districts. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-2j (West Supp. 2014) (permitting zoning commissions to establish “village districts,”
another name for neighborhood conservation districts). In the remainder of the states,
municipalities derive the power to enact conservation districts from historic districting
statutes, the general grant of zoning authority, or home-rule status. See, e.g., Bell v. City of

1576

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1525

by adopting state-level authorizing legislation that limits local discretion to impose
de facto development moratoria using conservation districts. Revisions to state-level
authorizing statutes should require conservation-district adoption processes to be
inclusive and to limit spillover effects. Regulations should be required by state
legislation to accommodate changing market dynamics, consumer preferences, and
understandings of sustainability.
A. Require Planning for Change
State authorizing statutes should require that aesthetic and contextual regulations
anticipate change, specifically the task of meeting demand for housing within the
district.282 Addressing different forms of restrictions on development, others have
posited procedural fixes intended to facilitate better land-use policy.283 In the case of
neighborhood conservation districts, substantive fixes, imposed by state
governments in their zoning-enabling statutes, may be a more direct approach to
cabin the negative impacts on affordability, inclusivity, and information
asymmetries.
1. Accommodate Future Demand
As discussed earlier, conservation districts are often adopted in response to
increased demand for housing.284 Developers and future housing consumers find
these neighborhoods desirable in some measure for their existing neighborhood
fabric but, more importantly, because these districts are close to important amenities
and resources—the waterfront, a downtown commercial center, a college campus, or
transportation infrastructure.285 If it is not primarily neighborhood fabric that attracts
new residents, developers and new residents do not have an interest in design
regulations. They suffer the negative effects of those regulations, but they do not see
any benefit from imposition of the regulations. In other words, there is no reciprocity
of advantage. Because the benefits of the regulatory imposition accrue to some, but
not to all, the regulations should be narrow so as to limit their cost to those who do

Waco, 835 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App. 1992) (upholding a neighborhood conservation district
as a valid exercise of the city’s police powers authorized by state law); Brief of
Defendant-Appellee at 10, Patmore v. Town of Chapel Hill, 757 S.E.2d 302 (N.C. Ct. App.
2014) (No. 13-1049), 2013 WL 6516982 (defending parking regulations in neighborhood
conservation districts as authorized under the general grant of zoning authority to North
Carolina municipalities).
282. While this Article’s primary audience is state legislators, courts as well as local and
sublocal actors may have roles to play as well. On the local and sublocal levels, as design-review
regulations are being crafted for a particular district, planners and lawmakers must work to ensure
that the regulations, in addition to meeting the strictures of authorizing statutes, anticipate change
and the possibility of growth. Courts, of course, will play a role in ensuring that local
governments comply with authorizing statutes and ordinances at the state and local levels.
283. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning
Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 112–18 (2011); Schleicher, supra note 11, at 1720–21.
284. See supra notes 172–217 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 228–34 and accompanying text.
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not benefit from the regulations. Accordingly, the purpose of design-review
regulations should not be to halt development. If regulations are intended to impose
a de facto development moratorium, the impact of those regulations will be to inflate
housing prices within the district and to push development to areas that are less
desirable. In housing markets, desirability is a function of location—proximity to
employment centers, transportation infrastructure, and other amenities.286 In this
way, the most desirable locations are often the most sustainable because residents of
these areas do not have to commute long distances by car on a daily basis.
Regulations that force development into less desirable locations have the unintended
consequence of forcing development into less sustainable locations.
Over the last thirty years, residents and planners crafting conservation-district
regulations have undertaken to regulate land development so that neighborhoods do
not change. In an attempt to preserve neighborhood character, they ignore both the
inevitability of change and the positive role that change plays in creating
neighborhood character. Instead, planners and residents should regulate land
development so that, as change happens, the fabric of the neighborhood is not
undone. State statutes should require conservation districts to identify areas that are
appropriate for redevelopment, growth, and densification. Instead of being drafted to
impose de facto development moratoria, design-review and conservation-district
regulations should be crafted to accommodate densification while preserving
neighborhood character.287 In order to further their stated purpose of conserving
neighborhood character, district regulations should describe how redevelopment
projects can maximize consistency with existing character. Duplexes and triplexes
can be required to be constructed to look like single-family homes. Row houses built
with no front setback may be more appropriate than garden apartments set back
twenty feet from the street, or vice versa. Areas close to commercial strips may be
more appropriate for dense development than are blocks dominated by single-family
homes. These are land-use choices appropriately made with public input. But they
should be made in a way that does not prevent new development, thereby inflating
housing prices and preventing future housing consumers from having the opportunity
to reside in the neighborhood.
One criticism of this argument is that it applies not just to conservation districts but
to zoning generally. All zoning should derive from a planning process that anticipates
and accommodates future demand in desirable locations. In fact, “about half of the
states compel their localities to prepare a comprehensive plan”288 and “California and
about a dozen other states require ‘consistency’ between a municipality’s land use

286. See, e.g., SOFIA BECKER, SCOTT BERNSTEIN & LINDA YOUNG, CTR. FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD TECH., THE NEW REAL ESTATE MANTRA: LOCATION NEAR PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION (2013) available at http://www.apta.com/resources/statistics/Documents
/NewRealEstateMantra.pdf.
287. Boise, Idaho, provides one example of a conservation-district ordinance that
anticipates redevelopment. The ordinance states, in relevant part, that one purpose of the Near
North End Conservation District shall be to “[a]llow for adaptive reuse of existing structures
for multiple-family residential and office uses.” BOISE, IDAHO, CITY CODE § 11-05-02(3)(A)(4)
(Supp. 2013).
288. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 74 (noting, however, that the state statutes are not
easy to classify).
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decisions and its comprehensive plan.”289 In addition, a handful of states have halfheartedly adopted New Jersey’s Mount Laurel doctrine, which requires each
municipality in the state to accommodate the development of affordable housing.290
Nevertheless, communities across the country continue to engage in restrictive zoning,
refusing to meet regional demand for housing and using land-use planning to exclude
a range of housing types, particularly affordable rental units. In addition, these
communities use planning to codify and freeze existing development patterns rather
than to accommodate redevelopment. Oftentimes, communities shroud exclusionary
land-use practices in purported desires to avoid overloading local infrastructure,291 to
preserve property values,292 or to prevent traffic congestion.293
Conservation-district advocates make no such efforts to pretend that they are
seeking to advance legitimate planning goals. The refusal to consider change is
embedded in the regulations. It is codified in the applicable ordinances. In the case
of conservation districts, identifying and cataloging the current architectural fabric
passes for planning. Codification and embalmment of existing land-use patterns
passes for planning. The planning process simply does not take into account the
possibility of change over time. That other land-use regulations, in practice, are
characterized by this same failure to consider change does not detract from this
problem and proposed solution in the realm of conservation districts. Indeed,
conservation districts are perhaps an extreme example of common problems in
land-use regulation—planning processes that ignore future housing consumers,
zoning decisions that are made outside of a comprehensive planning process, and
regulations intended to exclude renters and future housing consumers. These local
and sublocal failures can be addressed by state legislatures in authorizing statutes.
2. Prohibit Regulation of Irrelevant Building Features
In addition, authorizing statutes should prohibit conservation districts from
regulating (1) building features that are not visible from public rights-of-way and (2)

289. Id. at 69.
290. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 728 (N.J. 1975)
(“[B]roadly speaking, the presumptive obligation arises for each such municipality
affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for
an appropriate variety and choice of housing . . . .”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g
(West Supp. 2014) (describing the state’s affordable housing appeals procedure); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 40B, § 21 (LexisNexis 2006) (same). But see Brian R. Lerman, Mandatory
Inclusionary Zoning—The Answer to the Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 383, 402 (2006) (“The number of affordable units created by 40B—in a process that
penalizes municipalities for lacking affordable developments—has been rather small.”).
291. See, e.g., Builders Serv. Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 545 A.2d 530, 533 n.5
(Conn. 1988) (“Zoning regulations may be made with reasonable consideration for the
protection of historic factors and shall be made with reasonable consideration for the
protection of existing and potential public surface and ground drinking water supplies.”).
292. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa 1969) (holding that
stabilization of property values is a legitimate concern of zoning).
293. See First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Plan & Zoning Comm’n, 338 A.2d 490, 496 (Conn.
1973) (“One of the proper purposes of zoning . . . is to ‘lessen congestion in the streets.’”).
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tenure.294 These features are not relevant to neighborhood character and are not
susceptible to regulation through aesthetic land-use regulation.
First, conservation districts should not be used to regulate building features
unrelated to exterior design. The policy rationale underlying conservation districts
is the preservation of a neighborhood aesthetic, which is a function of the
appearance of public spaces and those portions of private buildings that are visible
from public rights-of-way. Some design-review ordinances recognize this fact and
restrict their reach to those elements of a building that are visible to the public.295
Others, however, overreach. As described above, cities like Chapel Hill and
Nashville have used conservation districts to regulate the number of bathrooms
permitted per bedroom.296 The number of bathrooms in a house is an interior
feature unrelated to the public appearance of a building. And there are surely more
efficient, more direct approaches to encouraging home ownership than to regulate
bedroom-to-bathroom ratios or to prohibit parking in front yards. Similarly, the
number of units in a building does not affect the exterior appearance of a building
and should not be the subject of design restrictions.
Second, conservation districts should not be used to regulate tenure.297
Policymakers have long cited encouraging home ownership as an important
policy goal. But recently, in the wake of an economic crisis in which residential
housing markets played an important role, economists and others have argued
that home ownership is not an unqualified good.298 Often, conservation districts
are motivated by the desire to limit the conversion of owner-occupied homes to
rental properties, but the regulations do not expressly regulate tenure. Tenure is
sometimes restricted by private law in private covenants, deed restrictions, and
common-interest ownership situations but is not typically governed by public
regulations. In a few instances, however, conservation districts expressly
regulate tenure.299 These tenure requirements are not related to design. Whether
a home is occupied by its owner or a renter has no impact on a neighborhood’s
aesthetic. Where renters cause secondary impacts, such as loud parties held by
college-student renters in Chapel Hill, those secondary impacts—not tenure
itself—should be regulated and controlled.

294. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE § 51A-4.501(e)(4), .505(c)(2) (Supp. 2014);
Cambridge, Mass., Avon Hill Neighborhood Conservation Dist. Designation Order (Dec. 14,
2009), available at http://www2.cambridgema.gov/historic/AHNCD_order.pdf (amended order).
296. See, e.g., CHAPEL HILL TOWN COUNCIL, NORTHSIDE NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION
DISTRICT PLAN 3 (2004), available at http://www.townofchapelhill.org/home/showdocument
?id=12179 (regulating bedroom-to-bathroom ratios); see also supra note 215 and
accompanying text.
297. Tenure, in this context, refers to whether property is owned or rented. See, e.g., Megan
Glasheen & Casius Pealer, Continuing the Conversation with Policy Makers: A Review of the
Brookings Institution Report on HOPE VI, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.
L. 104, 105 (2005).
298. E.g., Robert J. Shiller, Owning a Home Isn’t Always a Virtue, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013,
at BU6; Richard Florida, The Link Between High Levels of Homeownership and Unemployment,
ATLANTIC CITYLAB (May 9, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2013
/05/link-betweeen-high-levels-homeownership-and-unemployment/5520/.
299. See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text.
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3. Correct Information Deficiencies
Advocacy materials and press reports evidence conflicting accounts of the impact
of conservation districts on affordability. On the one hand, residents are told that
conservation districts will raise their property values.300 On the other, they are told
that conservation districts will preserve neighborhood affordability.301 Both claims
cannot be true. State authorizing statutes should be crafted to maximize the
information available to local legislators and residents considering whether to adopt
a conservation district and what the district regulations should limit.
First, state and local statutes that authorize conservation districts should require
that aesthetic regulations be revisited periodically. Authorizing statutes should
require that where a sublocal or local referendum is required to adopt a conservation
district, the regulations will be in effect for a designated period of time, not to exceed
five years, and a new referendum will be required in order to keep the regulations in
place.302 Where no referendum is required, authorizing statutes should require that
the applicable regulatory or legislative body reconsider each conservation district at
least once every five years and that, in connection with such reconsideration, the
body convene two or more public hearings noticed citywide.
A sunset provision will force aesthetic regulations to be responsive to changing
markets and changing public desires. If consumer preferences change over time, a
sunset provision will give voters the opportunity to account for those changing
preferences in a new referendum on the matter. With changing market conditions,
voter preferences will shift. As gas prices increase, voters may be willing to live in
smaller units in locations that are closer to employment so that they can avoid driving
great distances. As a neighborhood becomes more desirable and more costly,
property owners will have a financial interest in ensuring that they can construct an
in-law unit that will yield rental income. If a city’s schools improve and demand for
housing increases among families, residents may wish to ease restrictions that limit
expansion of existing homes.
Sunset provisions will also provide residents an opportunity to have input on the
administration of design guidelines. In the initial adoption process, voters typically
approve guidelines that are quite vague. Like the Noank regulations described
above,303 conservation-district guidelines are usually broad and subject to
interpretation.304 The degree to which regulations impede development depends on
the way in which the local commission or municipal staff administers the regulation.
After a conservation district has been in place for five years, local residents will be
able to take into account the way in which the regulations have been administered.
Perhaps the regulations have been administered rigidly, hindering renovations and
redevelopment projects that voters did not originally anticipate would be restricted.

300. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.
302. Cf. Melissa J. Mitchell, Comment, Cleaning Out the Closet: Using Sunset Provisions
To Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671, 1679 (2005) (arguing for the
importance of regular re-examination of criminal codes).
303. See supra Part II.A.
304. See supra notes 274–76 and accompanying text.
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If so, the sunset provision will permit voters to reconsider whether the conservation
district is meeting their expectations.
Where renters are included in conservation-district referenda, a sunset provision
will provide them crucial information regarding impacts on housing affordability. If
rents increase over the course of the initial term of the conservation district, that fact
may inform renters’ votes at the time that the district is considered for renewal.
Similarly, if local, in addition to sublocal, approval is required, a sunset provision
will provide “future housing consumers”305 with critical information that they may
not have had at the time of initial adoption of a conservation district. After a
conservation district has been in place for a period of time, voters may know whether
the conservation district resulted in higher housing prices in the district and in areas
surrounding the district. At the time of initial adoption, voters and legislators defer
to the residents of a conservation district in deciding whether such a district is
appropriate.306 If, however, after a district has been adopted, it becomes clear that the
adoption of the district is impacting housing prices or development patterns outside
of the district, voters and legislators at the local level will be more willing to defy
sublocal preferences and reject the continuation of a conservation district.
Some observers have expressed concern that sunset provisions create
opportunities for rent seeking, particularly by legislators who can delay or prevent
renewal of a provision scheduled to sunset.307 In the case where a referendum
determines whether a conservation district is renewed, the rent-seeking opportunities
are diminished. Individual residents, unlike elected legislators, are unlikely to seek
campaign contributions or other quid-pro-quo consideration in exchange for their
votes. In addition, the possibility of rent seeking may be a risk worth taking in light
of the potentially massive inefficiencies resulting from perpetual imposition of static
land-use regulations on an otherwise dynamic housing market.
One might worry that sunset provisions create transaction costs that, in turn, create
the risk of inefficient results.308 A tax provision, for example, may be sound fiscal
policy. Scheduled to sunset, however, that tax provision is not extended because the
transaction costs associated with passage of new legislation are too high. The result
is a suboptimal change in law that could have been avoided had the tax provision
been passed in the first instance without a sunset clause. This argument assumes,
however, that the expired provision was sound policy. If, instead, the original tax
provision was, or became over time, unsound, the sunset provision has effectively
limited the harm done by that provision. Of course, mere uncertainty can result in
inefficiencies. But those inefficiencies, when they take the form of information costs,

305. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part II.B.
307. E.g., Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation
and Prescriptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656 (2007).
308. Transaction costs can easily be minimized by automating certain aspects of the
renewal process. For example, typically before a referendum is held, proponents must collect
signatures demonstrating that some percentage of eligible voters support the referendum. That
requirement need not be met for renewal of conservation districts. Instead, the municipality
could automatically initiate a referendum on renewal of the conservation district one year
before the conservation district would otherwise expire.
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are not waste. The initial presunset period provides information about the impact of
the legislation that will inform the decision whether to renew the legislation.
Authorizing statutes can also address the information asymmetries by requiring
city planning departments to issue impact statements prior to adoption of a
conservation district. This approach would require the city planning department to
conduct an analysis of the likely impacts of district designation. Authorizing statutes
should require that impact statements address (1) housing prices and potential effects
on affordability; (2) estimated future demand for housing in the proposed district, the
locality, and the region; and (3) potential costs imposed on property owners to
comply with district regulations. Each impact statement should be released in
advance of one or more legislative or administrative public hearings. In addition,
each statement should be disseminated widely—at a minimum, to anyone eligible to
vote on the conservation-district referendum.
If the district regulations are drafted to accommodate all of the demand for
housing within the district, then there should be no impacts felt outside of the district.
If the district regulations, on the other hand, restrict supply below what might
otherwise have been built to meet demand, the impacts of that restriction on the local
housing economy should be estimated. Acknowledging these potential impacts will
cause policymakers and planners to draft or redraft the district regulations to
minimize negative impacts on housing affordability.
4. Distinguish Between Conservation Districts and Local Historic Districts
Authorizing statutes should distinguish between historic districts and
conservation districts.309 Conservation districts should not simply be historic districts
lite310 but, instead, should be clearly distinguishable from historic districts. Local
historic districts mummify neighborhoods. Any demolition, construction, exterior
renovation, or exterior decoration is subject to review by a local historic-district
commission. The commission is charged with ensuring that any alterations comport
with well-defined architectural standards.311 The externalities resulting from
mummification, however, are limited, provided the number of historic districts is
low. And, while there is no cap on the number of local historic districts, that number
is effectively limited because both the substantive and the procedural bars for
adopting historic districts are high.
In contrast, conservation districts require fewer procedural hurdles and need not
meet the same substantive requirements that apply to historic districts.312 Not every

309. For discussion of the differences between historic districts and conservation districts,
see supra text accompanying notes 45–57.
310. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
311. Local historic-district ordinances, rules, and practices often require renovation and
construction to comport with the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for the Treatment of
Historic Properties. Compare 36 C.F.R. § 68.3 (2014) (federal standards), with MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 399.201–.215 (West 2010), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24.1-1 to -10 (2009), and
SAVANNAH, GA. ZONING ORDINANCES § 8-3030 (2015). See also Local Preservation: Local
Historic District Zoning, R.I. HIST. PRESERVATION & HERITAGE COMMISSION,
http://www.preservation.ri.gov/local/local_zoning.php.
312. E.g., Kevin E. McCarthy, Village Districts Vs. Historic Districts, CONN. OFF. LEGIS.
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urban neighborhood is eligible for historic-district status. On the other hand,
typically, there are no eligibility standards for conservation-district designation. And
adoption is not subject to the same strictures as is adoption of historic districts. As a
result, it is much easier for a locality to adopt a conservation district than it is to adopt
a historic district.313 The ease of adoption increases the potential number of
conservation districts.314 The more districts designated, the greater the negative
spillover effects imposed on the residents of the city in which the conservation
districts are located.
In those cases in which there is reciprocity of advantage, historic districts are
appropriate, and regulations can be more stringent.315 Areas heavily dependent on
tourism, such as the French Quarter in New Orleans or downtown Charleston, South
Carolina, were among the first areas to adopt historic districts.316 In such areas, the
historic quality of the architecture fuels the dominant industry. As a result, each
property owner benefits from the assurance that every property in the district will
maintain its historic character. Owners of hotels, restaurants, and entertainment
venues benefit because they are frequented by visitors who are drawn to the area due
to its historic architecture. Other businesses benefit because they service tourism
organizations and provide other goods and services to those organizations’
employees and to tourists. And property owners benefit because the demand for
space to construct hotels, restaurants, and entertainment venues drives up property
values.317 If the district is narrowly defined to include a limited geographic area,
impacts on housing demand and affordability in the larger region can be muted.
Historic districts may invite the same questions raised by neighborhood conservation
districts, but where there is a strong reciprocity of advantage and the geographic area
of the district is limited, the benefits outweigh the costs.

RES. (Dec. 22, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/rpt/2003-R-0921.htm (“A municipality can
establish a [neighborhood conservation district] by amending its zoning regulations. . . .
Establishment of a local historic district requires the passage of an ordinance following a study
of the proposed district and the vote of property owners in the affected area in which at least
two-thirds vote in favor of creating the district.”).
313. Lovelady, supra note 10, at 175 (“Conservation districts are tailored to reach more
neighborhoods” than are historic districts.). By “tailored,” Lovelady, of course, means quite
the opposite. Because these ordinances are not tailored, they are available for use in almost
all neighborhoods.
314. Consider Nashville, which has six local historic districts and seventeen neighborhood
conservation districts. See MHZC District Boundaries and Design Guidelines, METRO GOV’T
NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENN., http://www.nashville.gov/Historical-Commission
/Services/Preservation-Permits/Districts-and-Design-Guidelines.aspx.
315. Thomas Merrill proposes applicable criteria where direct voting by property owners
is appropriate. Some of those criteria support my conclusion that property-owner voting is
inappropriate in the context of neighborhood conservation districts (i.e., such districts differ
from historic districts in relevant ways). See Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property
Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 275 (2010).
316. Rose, supra note 35, at 505.
317. This is not to say that everyone benefits from designation of a historic district. Renters
who prefer low rents to preserving architectural history are disadvantaged, as are property
owners who value the ability to renovate a building more than they value an increase in
property values due to historic-district designation.
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Most conservation districts are not defined by a strong tourism industry. In fact,
as described above, typically, these districts are rather ordinary residential
neighborhoods. The imposition of restrictive design regulations does not result in
reciprocal advantages enjoyed by all property owners, much less by all residents and
business owners. Instead, conservation-district regulations, even when adopted by a
supermajority of property owners, impose restrictions on a substantial minority of
property owners. And advocates of affordability should worry that where
conservation districts are not limited to a few, discrete areas, selected for their
historic integrity or tourism value, the impacts on citywide affordability will be
exponentially higher. As a result, conservation districts should be much less
restrictive, and interpreted much more narrowly, than are historic districts or other
regulations that are properly characterized as resulting in reciprocal advantages for
all property owners, if not residents.
While it might be appropriate to allow local governments to freeze a limited
number of historic districts in time, the same is not true for conservation districts.
Accordingly, it is critical that state statutes draw meaningful distinctions between
these two classifications so that conservation districts cannot be used as Trojan horses,
introducing strict historic district–type design-review processes to neighborhoods that
would not otherwise meet the requirements for historic-district designation.
B. Internalize Spillover Effects
In order to mitigate negative spillover effects outside of a conservation district,
designation processes should be inclusive and should include nonresidents and
renters. Inclusivity will permit some of the out-of-district impacts to be internalized
into the conservation-district adoption process. State legislation is the appropriate
vehicle for limiting the spillover effects associated with local and sublocal land-use
decisions.318 These recommendations are procedural in nature and prioritize
inclusivity. Admittedly, the outsized power of homeowners and neighborhood-level
interests suggests that procedural fixes will be insufficient to meaningfully limit
conservation districts. Even where renters and local governments are included in
conservation-district adoption and implementation, homeowners are likely to exert
disproportionate power and to continue to depress housing supply. As a result, these
procedural recommendations are important, but they are secondary to the substantive
fixes described in Part IV.A.
1. Include Renters in Referenda
Where standard practice or authorizing statutes require a referendum or petition
in order to designate a conservation district, the referendum or petition is intended
both to confirm community support for preservation of the “icon”319 and also to
solicit neighborhood-wide consent to imposition of increased restrictions on use of

318. See, e.g., 1 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 1, § 1:9 (“State courts generally have ruled
that the authority to enact zoning ordinances, the matters which may be regulated thereunder,
and the manner in which they may be enacted or amended, must be specifically delegated to
local governments for them to exercise the power to zone.”).
319. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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private property. Because the referendum is playing this dual role, it should not be
limited to property owners. All residents, not just property owners, have interests in
or against community stability and the values purportedly advanced by aesthetic
regulations. And renters have their own interest in preserving and furthering housing
affordability, an interest not shared by property owners and, therefore, wholly
excluded from referenda that are limited to property owners.
Where renters are excluded from a sublocal or local referendum required for
adoption of a conservation district, the relevant local or state law should be revised
to remove the property ownership requirement for voters. In a case study examining
a failed attempt to adopt a historic district by referendum in a neighborhood in New
Haven, Connecticut, Thomas W. Merrill argues in favor of direct voting by property
owners.320 Merrill favors limiting land-use referenda to property owners because they
“have a powerful incentive to inform themselves about any issue that will affect local
property values, either positively or negatively.”321 But limiting the franchise to
property owners introduces an element of bias into the voting scheme. The vote is
limited to those with an interest in property-value maximization and entirely
excludes any voter who might instead prefer housing affordability. Both are
legitimate policy goals. Neither should be eliminated from consideration before the
votes have been cast. Limiting the franchise to property owners effectively eliminates
from consideration the goal of making housing more affordable. So long as the vote is
limited to property owners, that bias cannot be exorcised from the referendum, and the
referendum itself is skewed in favor of a result that will increase housing prices, a result
contrary to the interest of the full one-third of the nation’s population that rents.322
In the BID or BLID context, where taxes are based on property ownership and on
the value of the property owned, the utility enjoyed by renters’ use of public services
is captured in the form of increased rents. As the argument goes, better provision of
public services by the BID or BLID will result in higher rents, which will in turn
result in higher property values, driving property owners’ votes. But even if one
believes that owner-only voting is appropriate in taxing districts, in the regulatory
context, there is no reason to create two classes of citizens by limiting voting in this
way. In Ellickson’s BLID model, the utility gained by a renter from a
well-maintained park or efficiently plowed streets is not considered in the decision
whether to provide those services.323 Similarly, where renters are excluded from a

320. Merrill, supra note 315.
321. Id. at 294. Merrill acknowledges that property ownership is a weak tool for assuring
that voters are well informed. Id. (“Some residents who are not property owners, such as
long-term tenants, may also be well informed about developments that affect the quality of
neighborhood life . . . .”).
322. See id. at 284 n.31 (noting the work of scholars who argue that limits on housing
construction have caused increases in housing prices).
323. Ellickson, supra note 169, at 94–95. Where property values are driven by potential
rents, the renters’ preferences impact local property value and, therefore, may affect the
homeowners’ decisions regarding public-service provision. The psychic value of home
ownership and the various tax benefits available to homeowners cause many homes in owner
occupant–dominated neighborhoods to exceed the value that one would expect based on the
present value of a rental income stream. A sales comparison will result in a higher property
valuation than would an income-capitalization approach. As a result, in many neighborhoods
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neighborhood conservation-district referendum, the decision-making process ignores
their desires. The simple fact that they do not own property does not mean that they
have no legitimate perspective on whether to preserve a culturally or historically
significant area. If renters are excluded from a sublocal referendum, the vote may
undercount, or overcount, desire for cultural stability. In addition, renters may have
other preferences that will be affected by the adoption of a neighborhood conservation
district. For example, if the imposition of design criteria will increase the cost of
property upkeep by, for instance, prohibiting vinyl windows, and will thereby increase
rents, renters will have a preference that is not capitalized into home values and that
remains unrepresented in the neighborhood conservation-district referendum.
Ellickson describes those who would challenge voting based on property
ownership as hyperegalitarians, and he argues that their fears for the wellbeing of
renters are unfounded.324 He argues that tenants have low costs of exit and, therefore,
the risk that they will suffer expropriation when excluded from the democratic
process is low.325 If they do not like the referendum results, they can simply leave.326
But housing markets are notoriously imperfect. The primary market input—land—
is strictly limited, and housing markets are heavily regulated by zoning codes that
discourage the provision of rental housing and tax codes that prefer owner-occupied
housing. Rarely are supply and demand in equilibrium, though scarcity of land and
regulations might impose a status quo (based on fixed supply) that results in
ever-increasing rents. A tenant may be unable to locate another housing option that
meets his or her needs. And even for renters, exit can be expensive. Leaving one
neighborhood for another may require other major life changes, such as changing
school districts or, where a tenant is leaving a neighborhood close to his or her
employment or one well-served by public transportation, incurring significant
additional transportation costs. Even the simple cost of moving furniture and
household items is substantial.
Notably, while Ellickson is not concerned with excluding renters’ voices in
BLIDs—entities primarily concerned with service provision—he acknowledges that
were a BLID to take on regulatory authority, its formation should be approved by a
majority of both owners and residents.327 Land-use regulations are markedly different
from the sorts of services Ellickson proposes that BLIDs should provide.328 A renter
typically does not control how his or her landlord chooses to procure services. A
renter is indifferent as to whether a landlord shovels the snow off of the sidewalk
herself, hires a contractor to shovel the snow, or, with other local property owners,
negotiates a preferred rate for a contractor to shovel the snow from all of the
sidewalks on the block. In the case of land-use regulations, however, a renter may be
more impacted than his landlord by regulations that permit a neighbor to construct a
4500 square-foot house on a 2000 square-foot lot. If the new house blocks a pleasant

dominated by single-family homes, renters’ preferences, even if they increase the rent that can
be charged to tenants, may not be reflected in home values.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 94.
327. Id. at 99.
328. See id. at 77.
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view or decreases natural light into the renter’s home, it affects the renter’s daily
existence. It may not affect the landlord at all.329
As Ellickson describes it, “American law rightly is more tolerant of grass-roots
deregulation than of grass-roots regulation.”330 This analysis militates against
adopting neighborhood conservation districts solely based on the input of property
owners. Renters, like property owners, are affected by the decision to adopt
neighborhood conservation districts. If neighborhood conservation districts are
efforts to ensure cultural stability, renters may be as invested in cultural stability as
property owners are. Interest in stability is more likely to be a function of the length
of one’s tenure in the neighborhood than whether that tenure is as a renter or a
homeowner. In fact, because renters have less control over the places where they live
than owner-occupants do, renters may have an enhanced interest in a regulatory
scheme that preserves their neighborhoods. To omit them from the decision to adopt
a neighborhood conservation district ignores the utility that they may gain from the
adoption, or not, of design-review guidelines. It also ignores and omits from any
public policy discussion those ends that are valued by renters but detrimental to
property owners, such as affordable rents.
2. Require Local Approval
In order to capture spillover effects and to include at least some future housing
consumers, authorizing legislation should require that each conservation district be
approved at both the sublocal and local levels. Underlying conservation-district
legislation is an assumption that the impact on conservation-district designations is
felt only by residents of the district. But these neighborhoods do not exist in a
vacuum. They are part of larger municipalities and regions. The local housing market
is certainly larger than a single conservation district. If imposition of a conservation
district constrains supply of housing in that district, the attendant impacts on price
are felt not just in the conservation district but also in the larger region.
In recognition of the impact that conservation-district designation has on the
larger housing market, approval of a conservation district should rest not just on the
district’s property owners but also on the residents of the municipality in which the
proposed district is located.331 In localities where a sublocal referendum is required,
the referendum should be administered citywide. In order for the district to be
approved, the referendum must be passed by a majority, or supermajority if so
required by the authorizing ordinance, of voters citywide and in the proposed district.
In localities where a referendum is not required but the local planning agency
designates conservation districts, administrators typically require evidence of
sublocal support in the form of petitions, nonbinding referenda, or testimony

329. The value of living next to a small house that does not block air and light may be
capitalized into the rental value. It may be outweighed by the value to the landlord of having
the ability to construct a larger house, like that on the neighboring lot, and collect a higher rent
for the additional square footage.
330. Ellickson, supra note 169, at 99.
331. Where the relevant housing market is larger than the municipality, state legislators
may wish to take a broader approach and require approval of a regional governance structure
(such as a county or even the state itself) or of neighboring municipalities.
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received at public hearings.332 In these cases, soliciting input from those who do not
reside in the proposed district will be more difficult. Nevertheless, where those who
do not reside in the district testify at public hearings, write letters, and otherwise
participate in the public process to express a viewpoint on whether a conservation
district should be adopted, these viewpoints should be considered just as valid as
those held by property owners in the conservation district.
It is appropriate to require local authorization of each individual conservation
district in addition to a local enabling ordinance permitting adoption of conservation
districts generally. The fact that the local legislative body adopted the authorizing
ordinance making conservation-district designation possible is not sufficient
protection of the interests of those who live outside of the proposed district. First,
when adopting authorizing legislation, legislators and voters may not have complete
information on what proposed conservation-district regulations will look like. They
may wish to authorize conservation districts generally but not to authorize particular
types of regulations. It may simply be impractical to identify and prohibit every type
of objectionable regulation in the authorizing legislation. Second, local government
may choose to permit adoption of conservation districts but balk at adoption of a
city’s fifteenth conservation district.
Requiring local approval is necessary to cabin spillover effects, but as discussed
in Part III, it is not sufficient.333 For that reason, it is crucial that conservation districts
be required to meet the substantive requirements described in Part IV.A so that
spillover effects are addressed in the substance of conservation-district regulations
and not only in the procedures required to adopt those regulations.
3. Impose Minimum Voter Turn-Out Requirements
Conservation districts present a vocal minority / silent majority problem. This
problem is not unique to conservation districts and affects policy making in all
realms.334 In the context of conservation districts, however, the problem is acute.
First, in the sublocal context, a small absolute number of voters can constitute a
simple majority. In practice, these neighborhoods can be quite small. Nashville’s
South Music Row neighborhood conservation district consists of just seventy
properties.335 Because neighborhood conservation districts require new construction
to be “contextual,” the smaller the district, the more limiting the regulations will be.
There is a stark difference between a requirement that a home’s design be
architecturally consistent with five thousand nearby homes and a requirement that

332. See supra Part II.B.
333. See supra Part III.B.1.
334. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1160
(discussing silent-majority problem in the context of immigration enforcement but
acknowledging that the vocal minority / silent majority problem “might be characteristic of a
number of subject areas where strong (often referred to pejoratively as ‘special’) interest
groups might prevail over a majority”).
335. South Music Row, METRO GOV’T NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENN.,
http://www.nashville.gov/Historical-Commission/Services/Preservation-Permits/Districts-and
-Design-Guidelines/South-Music-Row.aspx.
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the context be defined by the five closest homes.336 In addition, the small size of a
neighborhood conservation district might result in a few property owners being
greatly affected by the district designation.337 In the Glen Lennox neighborhood of
Chapel Hill, the movement to adopt the conservation district was spurred by a single
property owner’s desire to raze a fifty-year-old, low-density, one-story apartment
complex close to two major highways. The developer sought to replace the existing
complex with a shopping center, movie theater, hotel, parking structure, and almost
one thousand housing units.338 Neighbors, objecting to the scale of the proposed
changes, rallied to adopt a neighborhood conservation district, thus granting
themselves a greater degree of control over the redevelopment project. In 2011,
Brookline, Massachusetts, adopted its first neighborhood conservation district under
very similar circumstances. Troubled by a single property owner’s plan to redevelop
a postwar, low-rise, multifamily housing complex, neighbors voted to adopt a
conservation district by a ten-to-one ratio.339
A land-use regulation that affects the ability to use one’s home can have
deleterious effects on quality of life. Because the vocal minority / silent majority
problem is so acute, the process of adopting conservation districts should be
structured to maximize the likelihood that the referendum will accurately represent
community sentiment. To avoid the possibility that a vocal minority will prevail over
the desires of a silent majority, minimum voter turn-out requirements should be
imposed. These requirements are not intended to do away with conservation districts
altogether and can be set with reference to actual voter turnout in local elections in
the relevant municipality. But a conservation district should not be adopted based on
a voter turnout significantly less than that experienced in regular municipal elections.
Despite a culture that otherwise espouses free-market ideology and the
importance of free expression, the outsized role played by risk-averse homeowners
in the land-use arena and their desire to control perceived risks to their property
values has given us aesthetic context-based regulation in a majority of states. But the
conservation-district process is flawed. Planners, legislators, and courts should
subject it to heightened scrutiny. First, it overemphasizes the voice of existing
homeowners, to the exclusion of renters, nonresidents, and future housing
consumers. And because the impacted communities are, almost by definition,

336. That the context might be dictated by five nearby homes is not an extreme example.
The Noank ordinance discussed in Part II.A, supra, requires, for example, that context be
defined by the homes within two hundred feet of the proposed structure.
337. E.g., Glen Lennox Area Neighborhood Conservation District Development (CD-8)—
Background and Process, TOWN CHAPEL HILL, http://www.townofchapelhill.org/town-hall
/departments-services/planning-and-sustainability/resources/neighborhood-conservation-district
-ncd-zoning-overlays/glen-lennox-ncd-background (“The Committee continued meeting from
September of 2011 to March of 2012 to develop NCD zoning overlay regulations, design
guidelines, and Guiding Principles for the Glen Lennox apartment and commercial property
which are referred to as CD-8C.”).
338. Mark Schultz, Plan ‘Done Hastily,’ Developer Says, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 26, 2008, at B1; Schultz & Arounnarath, supra note 190.
339. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 43 (“Community activist William Pu said that in
designating Hancock Village as a conservation district . . . [the town] was acting ‘to preserve
the public good from the actions of a single entity.’”).
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desirable, conservation districts—by restricting density and, therefore, the total
number of housing units—cut off the supply of a valuable good and artificially inflate
the price of housing located near fixed amenities, such as downtown business
districts and transportation nodes. Land-use policy is characterized by decades of
exclusionary motivations and impacts. Local governments should not empower
sublocal groups to perpetuate these policies through conservation districts.
A generation ago, a scholarly consensus emerged to explain the movement of
courts toward accepting aesthetics as a basis for exercise of the police power. This
consensus relied on context, or cultural stability, as a legitimate rationale for aesthetic
regulation. But cultural stability is no more a legitimate or widely held value than is
cultural change. And while a powerful voting bloc might prefer to establish a
conservation district, often voices that prefer change to stability are excluded from
that decision. Because of evolving market dynamics and demographics, change is
inevitable in the land-use arena, and desirable neighborhoods should not be frozen in
time and walled off from would-be residents in the name of “conservation.”

